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INTRODUCTION

As we enter a new millennium, the Equal Employment Opportunity
ommission's (EEOC or Commission) ongoing effort to eradicate both
workplace discrimination and retaliation faces an uphill battle as the
number of retaliation claims continues to increase.' A thorough analysis of
circuit court decisions involving claims of workplace retaliation reveals
that, since enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, many circuits have
narrowed the scope of the relevant anti-retaliation provisions by requiring
that an adverse action following lawfully protected equal employment
opportunity (EEO) activity constitutes either an "ultimate employment
action" or results in "material harm" 2to the charging party's "terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.",
1. Commission statistics from the private sector reveal that the total number of
retaliation claims has risen steadily throughout the 1990's. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS FISCAL YEAR 1992 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR

2000 (2001), available at www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Jan. 18, 2001).
In Fiscal Year 1992, 15.3% of all charges included a charge of retaliation. Id. In Fiscal
Year 2000, 27.1% of all charges filed included a charge of retaliation. Id.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). As this
article will demonstrate, the majority of decisions construing the "adverse action" element
of a prima facie case of retaliation narrowly have been issued since the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was enacted. See infra Part HI. At least one commentator has suggested that courts
never had occasion to question what constitutes an adverse action because the penalties
were not substantial to the employer prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
See Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful
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The EEOC has consistently argued that in assessing whether conduct
constitutes an adverse action in a claim of retaliation, courts should
determine whether the conduct would reasonably deter a charging party or
others from engaging in EEO activity.3 Notwithstanding the EEOC's
position, many circuits require the plaintiff to show that the adverse action
either rose to the level of an "ultimate employment action," such as failing
to hire, failing to promote, terminating, demoting or denying leave, or
resulted in "material" harm to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."*
Requiring that an adverse action constitutes either an "ultimate
employment action" or results in "material" harm to a term, condition, or
privilege of employment in order to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation is inconsistent with the plain language of the anti-retaliation
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)5 and
Further, such a requirement
related anti-discrimination statutes.6
contravenes the broad remedial goals of these statutes and is inapposite to
the more liberal construction courts have given analogous anti-retaliation
provisions in other federal statutes enacted to protect employee rights. The
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Company interpreted the antiretaliation provision of Title VII broadly, specifically stating that
individuals who engage in EEO activity rely on the anti-retaliation
provisions in order to maintain unfettered access to the EEO process.' As
this article will establish, courts should broadly interpret the threshold, or
adverse action requirement in a claim of retaliation under the applicable
anti-discrimination statutes. Otherwise, employers will continue to take
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattem: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 14
LAB. LAw. 373, 379, n.32 (1998); see also Edward. C. Walterscheid, A Question of
Retaliation:OppositionConduct as ProtectedExpression UnderTitle VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L. REv. 391, 404 (1988) (discussing the ease of satisfying the adverse
employment action requirement of a prima facie case of retaliation).
3. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, at 88 (1998), available at http:llwww.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html [hereinafter EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL].

4. See infra discussion Part II; see also Eric M. D. Zion, Overcoming Adversity:
Distinguishing Retaliation from General Prohibitions Under Federal Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 76 IND. L. J. 191, 206-07 (2001).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
6. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994);
Age Discrimination In Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994); Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1994). Other federal statutes prohibit
unlawful retaliation. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)
(1994); Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994);
Employee Income and Retirement Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994); Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994).
7. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
8. Id. at 346.
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retaliatory actions with impunity, individuals will be deterred from filing
charges of discrimination, and ultimately, the EEOC's ability to enforce
anti-discrimination laws will be hindered. 9
Part I introduces the claim of retaliation by setting forth the relevant
language in Title VII and by reviewing the Supreme Court's burdenshifting analysis under the applicable anti-discrimination statutes. Part II
summarizes how each circuit has construed the adverse action element
required to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Part Ell argues that
courts should adopt the EEOC's deterrence standard to determine what
constitutes an adverse action in a prima facie case of retaliation because it
is consistent with both the plain language and the broad remedial goals of
the applicable anti-retaliation provisions. Part IV argues that courts should
not require that retaliation result in tangible harm or rise to the level of
severe or pervasive conduct in order to state a claim because retaliatory
acts which fall short of these thresholds may nonetheless effectively deter
charging parties or others from engaging in EEO activity.
A.

Defining a Claim of Retaliation

Title VII and the other EEO statutes prohibit both discrimination and
retaliation in the private sector.' 0 Because courts have interpreted the antiretaliation provisions of other anti-discrimination statutes by applying
standards developed for analyzing Title VII claims, this article focuses on
retaliation claims brought under section 704(a) of Title VII.'
B.

Title VII's Relevant Language

Title VII's general prohibition
703(a)(1), provides, in relevant part:

against

discrimination,

section

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
9. See Zion, supra note 4, at 194.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. Retaliation against federal government employees
is also unlawful under § 717 of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. See Hashimoto v. Dalton,
118 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Sec'y of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
11. The Supreme Court has applied Title VII principles to ADEA claims and noted that
"the substantive provision of the ADEA 'were derived in haec verba from Title VII."'
Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978)); see also Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 456 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(stating that the standards used to evaluate Title VII claims are applied to claims under the
ADA, ADEA and ERISA); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
1278, 1287 (11 th Cir. 1997) (noting that anti-retaliation provision under ADA is similar to
Title VII, and Title VII framework would be applied to ADA retaliation claim); Newman v.
GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases which have
concluded that Title VII analysis should apply to ADA claims).
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fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
12
When drafting the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, Congress
chose to use language different from the general prohibition. Section
704(a) of Title VII states that it is an unlawful employment practice for an
employer "to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.' ' 13 The relevance of the phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" which is contained in the anti-discrimination
provision (section 703(a)) but not the anti-retaliation provision (section
704(a)) will become evident when analyzing how the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII has been construed by the circuits. 4
C. Establishingand Proving a Claim of Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation based on circumstantial

evidence, 5 a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she engaged in
16
protected
or shelink
experienced
an protected
adverse employment
action, andactivity,
(3) there (2)
was he
a causal
between the
activity and

12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(2), provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
13. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a).
14. See izfra Parts II.A-L.
15. Claims of discrimination use the burden-shifting analysis articulated by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Texas

Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1983) (refining the burdenshifting analysis); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (refining
the burden-shifting analysis); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000)
(refining the burden-shifting analysis). This analysis is also applied to claims of retaliation.
See Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987).
16. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-4 - 8-5. Under section 704(a), a
charging party engages in protected activity by either opposing a practice made unlawful by
one of the employment discrimination statutes (generally referred to as the "opposition"
clause), or by filing a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an
investigation, preceding, or hearing under the applicable anti-discrimination statute
(generally referred to as the "participation" clause). Id.
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7

the adverse action.'
When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action or actions.18 Ultimately, the burden remains with the
plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employer's reason was pretextual and that retaliatory animus motivated the
employer's action.' 9 While courts and commentators have wrestled with
divergent case law concerning each of the elements of a prima facie case of
retaliation,20 this article will focus on the second element of a prima facie
17. Cude & Steger, supra note 2, at 377. Some courts also require, as a separate
element of a prima facie case of retaliation, that the plaintiff establish that the employer was
aware that the plaintiff engaged in EEO activity. See id. at 377 n.22 ("The Second Circuit
requires a plaintiff to prove that her employer knew of her participation in the protected
activity."); see also Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that the exercise of protected rights must be known to the defendant to prove a
prima facie case of retaliation). Whether or not set forth as a separate element, knowledge
of the plaintiff's EEO activity by the employer is a prerequisite in any claim of retaliation,
as a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between his or her protected activity and the
adverse action at issue. See Cude & Steger, supra note 2, at 377, 380. Moreover, there can
be no causal connection if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the employer was aware of
plaintiff's protected activity at the time the employer took an adverse action. Id. at 377.
Where direct evidence of discrimination is present, courts may instead examine whether or
not an employer has established a mixed motive by demonstrating that it also had a
legitimate motive for its actions. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-46
(1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, overruled the portion of Price Waterhouse
precluding employer liability if an employer establishes a mixed motive for its actions.
Specifically, if an employer establishes that legitimate motives for its otherwise unlawful
action also motivated its actions, then the employer is still liable, although damages will be
limited. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Since the Civil Rights Act of 1991
did not specifically refer to claims under section 704(a) when it overruled Price
Waterhouse, whether the act applies to section 704(a) claims of retaliation remains
unanswered. See Eve I. Klein & Rosemary Halligan, A Rising Tide of Retaliation Claims
Challenges Employers to Adopt Adequate Preventive Measures, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 51, 54-56
(1999) (discussing mixed motive retaliation claims and citing relevant cases interpreting
section 704(a) in mixed motive cases); Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation Cases:
Creating a New Protected Class, 58 U. PiTt. L. REV. 405, 425 n.153 (1997) ("Congress
explicitly included section 704 retaliation in its 1991 expansion of remedies but did not
mention retaliation in... [the] sections dealing with proof of discrimination.") (citations
omitted)).
18. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
19. Id. at 804.
20. See generallyMelissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers,
Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. RaV. 115 (1998) (evaluating the various components in each
element of a prima facie retaliation case); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Defining ProtectedActivity
in Retaliation Cases, 1997 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 285 (analyzing how recent court decisions diverge
in their treatment of the "protected activity" element); Ernest F. Lidge IlI, The Meaning of
Discrimination:Why Courts Have Erred in RequiringEmployment DiscriminationPlaintiffs
to Prove that the Employer's Action Was Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L.
REV. 333 (1999) (analyzing the varying approaches to the "adverse action" element of a
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case of retaliation, namely, what constitutes an adverse employment action.
II.

DEFINING "ADVERSE ACTION" IN SECTON

704(A) RETALIATION

CLAIMS: A CIRCur BY CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

Title VII neither defines the term "discriminate," which is found in
both Title VII's anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions, nor the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," which is found
Additionally, the
only in Title VII's anti-discrimination provision. 2
Supreme Court has never addressed what constitutes "discrimination"

within the meaning of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, section 704(a),
leaving the question to be addressed by the circuits. While the circuit
courts agree that employment decisions involving actions such as hiring,
discharge, compensation, leave, promotion and demotion constitute adverse
actions under section 704(a), 22 the courts disagree about whether less
egregious employment actions (i.e., poor performance evaluations, lateral
transfers, intermediate acts of discipline and harassment) constitute adverse

actions under section 704(a).
A.

The First Circuit

The First Circuit broadly construes the adverse action element in
section 704(a) claims. 23 In Randlett v. Shalala,24 the court noted that even
prima facie retaliation case); Ray, supra note 17 (focusing on the developments affecting
section 704(a) of Title VII).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (excluding these terms in the "Definitions" section of Title VII).
22. See, e.g., Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1191 (lth Cir. 1997)
(finding that a plaintiff withstood summary judgment on a retaliation claim where his
employer fired him for testifying in a sexual harassment case brought by another employee,
even though the plaintiff was the alleged harasser in that case); Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med.
Ctr., 97 F.3d 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a terminated employee could survive
summary judgment even though her case was based largely on circumstantial evidence);
Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 195 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the district
court's finding of an adverse employment action despite conflicting testimony on whether or
not the employee was actually fired); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994)
(explaining that other adverse actions in addition to discharge are covered by the antiretaliation provision of Title VII); Robinson v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 894-95
(3d Cir. 1993) (discharging an employee after a series of protected activities constituted an
adverse employment action); Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 785-86
(9th Cir. 1986)(addressing the elimination of a tenure-track teaching position); Barela v.
United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149, 152 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding against an employer in a
failure-to-hire case).
23. See Welsh v. Derwinski, 14 F.3d 85, 86 (1st Cir. 1994) (reducing duties prior to a
desk audit, thus eliminating the employee's potential for a status upgrade, constitutes
adverse action); Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15 (finding that termination, denial of promotion,
negative performance evaluation, involuntary transfer, and denial of permission to allow
plaintiff to select class curriculum constituted adverse actions under section 704(a)).
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though section 704(a) does not limit retaliation to the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" like Title VlH's anti-discrimination provision
(section 703(a)), the court would incorporate by reference the "terms,
conditions and privileges of employment" qualifier of section 703(a) into
the adverse action determination in a section 704(a) retaliation claim 25
Although the court in Randlett expressed concern that a broad
interpretation of the adverse action element of a Title VII retaliation claim
may encourage employees, "who earlier filed complaints and are now
aggrieved by slights," to file "whimsical claims," it nonetheless concluded
that an employer's subsequent refusal to transfer an employee after the
employee had filed an EEOC complaint is not automatically outside of
Title VII's protection.26
B.

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit takes a case-by-case approach to analyzing
retaliation claims and has stated that adverse employment actions must
allege "material" harm to a term, condition, or privilege of employment in
order to state a claim under section 704(a).2 7
24. 118 F.3d 857 (lst Cir. 1997).
25. Id. at 862 (concluding that denial of a transfer to a similar position in another
facility with the same pay and benefits constitutes adverse action under section 704(a)). In
reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit cited to the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v.
King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 75-76 (11 th Cir. 1984), wherein the court concluded that
the phrase "terms and conditions" in section 703(a) is open-ended and could include
opportunities that are not strictly entitlements. Randlett, 118 F.3d at 862.
26. Randlett, 118 F.3d at 862; see also Serrano-Cruz v. DFI P.R., Inc., 109 F.3d 23, 26
(1st Cir. 1997) ("Common sense suggests that a job transfer without a reduction in salary
and benefits may, under certain circumstances, be unacceptable to a reasonable person who
is overqualified and humiliated by an extreme demotion, or under qualified and essentially
'set up to fail' in a new position.").
27. See Weeks v. New York State, No. 00201, 2001 WL 1345057, at *4-6 (2d Cir. Oct.
31, 2001) (affirming a motion to dismiss because the alleged claims, including the filing of a
grievance, receiving a notice of discipline and a counseling memo, and transferring the
plaintiff to another office and relocating her files, did not comprise material adverse
actions); Garber v. N.Y. City Police Dept., 159 F.3d 1346, No. 97-9191, 1998 WL 514222,
at *4 (2d Cir. June 12, 1998) (transferring a police officer from the Chaplain's unit to the
recruitment section after alleging bias did not constitute material adverse action because the
officer retained the same pay, benefits, hours worked, job title, and opportunities for
promotion); Wanamaker v. Colombian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1997)
(barring a terminated employee from using the office and phone prior to departure presented
only a "minor, ministerial stumbling block toward securing future employment"); United
States v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Reasonable defensive
measures do not violate the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, even though such steps
are adverse to the charging employee and result in differential treatment."); Johnson v.
Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 208-10 (2d Cir. 1991) (prohibiting employees from utilizing the
union's grievance arbitration mechanism after filing an EEOC charge violates relevant antiretaliation provisions); Dominic v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 822 F.2d 1249, 1254-
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In Torres v. Pisano,28 the plaintiff alleged that her employer had
unlawfully retaliated against her when two management officials demanded
that she drop EEOC charges she had filed against the employer.29 The
plaintiff also contended that these demands constituted unlawful
retaliation. 0 In concluding that management's request did not constitute an
adverse action, the court stated:
It is conceivable that a demand to withdraw an EEOC charge
could constitute retaliation, if it truly had so great an effect on the
plaintiff as to alter the conditions of her employment in a material
way. For instance, repeated and forceful demands accompanied
even by veiled suggestions that failure to comply would lead to
termination, discipline, unpleasant assignments or the like, might
in some circumstances affect an employee's working conditions.
But here... [plaintiff] admits that... [the management officials]
did not repeat their requests, that she in fact refused their
requests, and that she suffered no negative consequences as a
result of having turned them down. As such .... [plaintiff] did
not experience an adverse employment action.1
However, in Preda v. Nissho Iwai American Corp.,32 the plaintiff, an
office assistant, argued, among other things, that after alleging bias against
a corporate manager, he was: (1) excluded from departmental meetings and
outings with his clients; (2) required to perform largely clerical tasks when
he had previously been working on business development for his employer;
(3) denied a transfer to another position specifically because he complained
of bias; and (4) issued "good" or "fully satisfactory" performance ratings
despite having previously been rated "outstanding. 33 The Second Circuit
vacated the lower court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact that he experienced adverse employment
actions based on the above allegations, and noted that Title VIl's language
prohibiting discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.., is not limited to 'pecuniary emoluments,' but includes
discriminatory-motivated diminution of duties. 34
55 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding that the evidence supported a jury verdict of retaliation under
the ADEA where an employee, who was placed under the supervision of an alleged
discriminating official, received lower evaluations, and was deluged with work which was
impossible to complete, thus leading to discharge). But see Rodriguez v. Bd. of Educ., 620
F.2d 362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980) (transferring an art teacher from junior high school to
elementary school constituted an adverse employment action).
28. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
29. Id. at 629.
30. Id.
31. Id. at640.
32. 128 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 1997).
33. Id. at 790-91.
34. Id. at 791 (citation omitted) (quoting de la Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin.

324

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:2

In Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional
Service, the Second Circuit recognized a split in the circuits as to whether
an allegation of a hostile environment based on retaliation can satisfy the
adverse action element and establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
the ADEA.3 6 The court adopted the view that "unchecked retaliatory coworker harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute [an] adverse
employment action so as to satisfy the... [adverse action] prong of the
retaliation prima facie case. 3 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court
recognized that "Title VII does not 'define adverse employment action
solely in terms of job termination or reduced wages and benefits, and that
less flagrant reprisals by employers may indeed be adverse."' 3s The court
then reaffirmed its own prior decisions, which held that an adverse action
must have a material impact on a term, condition or privilege of
employment. 39 The court also noted that if an employer knows about, but
fails to correct, co-worker hostility, then the employer may be liable for a
hostile environment based on retaliatory animus, like a claim of harassment
based on race or sex. 40
C.

The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit has not specifically set a threshold for what
constitutes an adverse action in a retaliation claim under Title VII. It has,
however, concluded that such claims are only cognizable if an adverse
action impacts a term, condition, or privilege of employment. In Robinson
v. City of Pittsburgh,4' the plaintiff alleged that after filing a complaint of
sexual harassment, she endured a series of unsubstantiated oral reprimands
and derogatory comments by the alleged harasser.42 The Third Circuit
concluded that these unsubstantiated oral reprimands and derogatory
comments did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action under
section 704(a), and stated that:
Retaliatory conduct other than discharge or refusal to rehire is

Dep't of Soc. Serv., 82 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO
Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that lost wages dues to a
oneweek suspension constituted an adverse action, even though the wages were reimbursed
"some time later").
35. 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
36. Id. at 445-46.
37. Id. at 446.
38. Id. (quoting Wanamaker v. Colombian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir.
1997)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
42. Id. at 1300.

2002]

DETERRENCE V. MATERIAL HARM

thus proscribed by Title VII only if it alters the employee's
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"
deprives him or her of "employment opportunities," or
"adversely affect[s] his [or her] status as an employee." It
follows that 'not everything that makes an employee unhappy'
qualifies as retaliation, for "[o]therwise, minor and even trivial
employment actions that 'an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder
employee'
did not like would form the basis of a discrimination
'
suit.' ,47

The court also noted that "[c]ourts have operationalized the principle that
retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
into the doctrinal requirement that the alleged retaliation constitute 'adverse
employment action."' 4
The court then stated that the "'adverse
employment action' element of a retaliation plaintiffs prima facie case
incorporates the same requirement that the retaliatory conduct rise to the
level of violation of [section 703(a)]." 45
In Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 46 the plaintiff alleged that he was denied
training, received negative performance reviews, endured harassment when

43. Id. (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,441 (7th Cir. 1996)).
44. Id. (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.
1996)); see also Cardenas v. Massey, No. 00-5225, 2001 WL 1230325, at *10 (3d Cir. filed
Oct. 16, 2001) (citing Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300, the court assumed, arguendo, that a
constructive discharge claim constituted an adverse employment action).
45. Id. at 1300-01. The Third Circuit also suggested that this standard could apply to
post-employment actions.
Although the instant case does not require us to resolve the issue, it appears
from our decisions in Nelson and Charlton that a plaintiff who claims that the
alleged retaliation prejudiced his or her ability to obtain or keep future
employment would meet the standard we announce today by showing that the
retaliatory conduct was related to his or her future employment and was serious
enough to materially alter his or her future employment prospects or conditions.
Id. at 1301 n.15; see also Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 389 (3d Cir. 1995) (barring a
former employee from returning to the employer's campus without prior permission did not
constitute a retaliatory adverse action); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 202
(3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that a claim of retaliatory post-employment conduct states a
claim of retaliation if plaintiff demonstrates that retaliatory conduct was related to future
employment). The following month, the Third Circuit decided EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co.,
123 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 1997), wherein the court reversed the district court's award of fees
against the EEOC, finding that the EEOC established a prima facie case of retaliation
against the employer. Id at 754. The court disagreed with the employer's argument that a
denial of a reference is retaliatory only if it resulted in an adverse action (i.e., that the
prospective employer did not hire the plaintiff). Id. at 754 n.4. The court noted that such
evidence is only relevant to prove damages, and stated that "[t]he issue of whether... [the
prospective employer] would have hired... [the plaintiff] is not at all relevant to
whether... [the employer] is liable for retaliatory discrimination." Id.
46. 204 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2000)
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his co-workers increased the temperature of the office on four or five
occasions to exacerbate this disability, and was ultimately terminated
because of his disability in violation of the ADA.47 The Third Circuit
concluded that the four or five isolated instances of alleged harassment did
not rise to the level of an adverse employment action necessary to maintain
a claim of either discrimination or retaliation. 48 Concerning the negative
performance evaluations, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
establish a causal connection between the negative evaluations and either
his disability or his EEO activity.49 In reaching this conclusion, the court
stated:
[W]e also make the following observations with respect to
performance evaluations. While it is possible that a manager
might make a poor evaluation to retaliate against an employee for
making an EEOC charge, still it is important that an employer not
be dissuaded from making what he believes is an appropriate
evaluation by a reason of a fear that the evaluated employee will
charge that the evaluation was retaliatory. In this regard, we are
well aware that some employees do not recognize their
deficiencies and thus erroneously may attribute negative
evaluations to an employer's prejudice. Accordingly, in a case
like this in which the circumstances simply cannot support an
inference that the evaluations were related to the EEOC charges,
a court should not hesitate to say so. °
In Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that
prior to engaging in EEO activity, he arrived for work between 6:00 a.m.
and 8:00 a.m. and finished by 2:00 p.m., but he was assigned to a
"punishment" shift from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. in retaliation for his having
engaged in EEO activity.52 The district court concluded that the minimal
change in working hours did not constitute an "extreme hardship" because
most of the workforce worked the same or similar hours. 53

The Third

Circuit disagreed, stating that the plaintiff "proffered evidence sufficient to
establish for present purposes that the change in his schedule may have
altered the 'terms, conditions, or privileges' of his employment in violation
of [the ADA's anti-retaliation provision]. 54
The court stated that
"[a]ssigning an employee to an undesirable schedule can be more than a
47. Id. at 499.
48. Id. at 506.
49. Id. at 505.
50. Id.
51. 162 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1998).
52. Id. at 780.
53. Id. at 786-87 (quoting Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. 976 F. Supp. 277,
284 (D. Del. 1997))
54. Id. at 787 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1994)).
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'trivial' or minor change in the employee's working conditions." 55 The
court further noted that the district court failed to analyze the ADA's broad
anti-retaliation provision and stated that "[n]othing in the ADA suggests
that employers are prohibited from
5 7 taking only those retaliatory actions that
impose an 'extreme hardship.'
In Dilenno v. Goodwill Industries of Mid-Eastern Pennsylvania," the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff's allegation that her transfer to a
job which the employer knew she could not do may constitute an adverse
action taken in retaliation for her complaints about sexual harassment.5 In
reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit stated:
To be clear, we hold that a transfer to a job that an employer
knows an employee cannot do may constitute adverse
employment action. We base our holding on the principle that
what constitutes retaliation depends on what a person in the
plaintiffs position would reasonably understand. It is important
to take a plaintiff's job-related attributes into account when
determining whether a lateral transfer was an adverse
employment action. An inability to do a particular job is jobrelated, unlike the desire to live in a certain city.' °
The court found that the plaintiff had performed her prior position
satisfactorily for two years, and that the decision to transfer her to a
position the employer allegedly knew she could not do constituted an
adverse action under section 704(a), even though her pay and benefits
61
remained the same and the jobs were similar.
D. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit requires that retaliatory acts adversely affect a
term, condition, or privilege of employment in order to state a claim of
retaliation.6 2 In Von Gunten v. Maryland, the court distinguished a prior
55. Id. at 788 (quoting Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep't,98 F.3d 107,
116 (3d Cir. 1996)).
56. Id. at 788-89.
57. Id. at788.
58. 162 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 1998).
59. Id. at 236.

60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 411-12 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding that transferring a teacher to a school with a poor reputation, and assigning the
teacher to an undesired position after he requested and was denied the opportunity to teach
physics could constitute an adverse action under section 703(a)); Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42
F.3d 825, 831 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that a transfer, even without loss of pay or
benefits, may constitute an adverse employment action under section 703(a)).
62. See Peterson v. West, No. 01-1026, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19726, at *5-6 (4th Cir.
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decision, Page v. Bolger,63 by noting that in Page, the court interpreted
section 717(a) of Title V1164 and its holding thus did not apply to claims of
retaliation under section 704(a).6 5 The court also noted that its prior
holdings "teach that conduct short of 'ultimate employment decisions' can
constitute adverse employment action for the purposes of [section 704(a)]"
and that "retaliatory harassment" can also comprise adverse employment
action. ,,66 The court affirmed the district court's conclusions that none of
the allegations by the plaintiff comprised adverse actions sufficient to state
a claim of retaliation. 67
In Page, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
prima facie case in a non-selection claim should be modified, and in so
holding, noted that:
[I]t is obvious to us that there are many interlocutory or mediate
decisions having no immediate effect upon employment
conditions which were not intended to fall within the direct
proscriptions of § 717 and comparable provisions of Title VII.
We hold here merely that among latter are mediate decisions
such as those concerning composition of the review committees
in the instant case that are simply steps in a process for making
such obvious end-decisions as those to hire, to promote, etc.68

Sept. 5, 2001) (affirming summary judgment where changed job duties, which did not affect
the plaintiffs official job title or pay, did not comprise and adverse employment action that
could be characterized as an ultimate employment decision); Von Gunten v. Md., 243 F.3d
858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001). But see Elkins v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 217 F.3d 838, No. 001077, 2000 WL 962669, at *2 (4th Cir. July 12, 2000) (noting that the adverse actions at
issue, although affecting the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment, did not
comprise actionable ultimate employment decisions). Prior decisions did not address the
standard for what constitutes an adverse action in the Fourth Circuit. See Smith v. First
Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 248 n.11 (4th Cir. 2000).
63. 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981).
64. Section 717(a) of Title VII, as amended by section 11 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, governs employment by the federal government, and provides, in
relevant part, that "all personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment.., shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994).
65. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866.
66. Id. at 865; see also Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.
1985) (remanding a claim of retaliatory harassment and discharge). The Fourth Circuit also,
in Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998), recognized a claim of retaliatory
harassment. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865. However, in Causey, the court concluded only
that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of retaliatory harassment because of
his failure to establish the causation element. Causey, 162 F.3d at 803. The court did not
specifically address the adverse action element. Id.
67. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 870.
68. Page, 645 F.2d at 233. At least one circuit has relied on Page to limit the adverse
action element in section 704(a) retaliation claims to include only ultimate employment
actions. See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
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In Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit reversed a finding of retaliation and concluded that the plaintiff
70
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 704(a)
In Munday, the plaintiff filed a sexual harassment and sex discrimination
complaint and was subsequently terminated for alleged insubordination. 7
Thereafter, the plaintiff and employer executed a settlement agreement
wherein the employer agreed to reinstate her employment and not retaliate
against her.72 Prior to returning to work, however, the employer's general
manager instructed the plaintiffs co-workers to ignore her, spy on her, and
report anything to him because he wanted to fire her.7 3 In addition to being
ignored and spied on, the plaintiff alleged she was assigned to a route that
she did not request and was subjected to other work-related incidents of
harassment.7 4 Ultimately, the plaintiff went on leave for panic-related
attacks, sought and obtained another job, and left her employer. 5 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of retaliation,
stating that "as a matter of law, this scenario does not rise to the level of an
adverse employment action for Title VII purposes. 7 6 It clarified that the
circuit had never held the conduct of ignoring and spying on an employee
to constitute an adverse action without evidence of any harm to a term,
allegations consisting of a denial of training, denial of consideration for a promotion, and
adverse working conditions did not constitute ultimate employment actions under section
704(a)); see also Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that alleged acts of hostility by fellow employees, theft of employee's tools, and
resulting anxiety were not adverse employment actions and that an alleged visit by
supervisors to employee's home, a verbal threat of termination, a reprimand for not being at
an assigned station, and placing employee on "final warning" were not adverse actions
constituting an ultimate employment decision). The Fourth Circuit specifically concluded
that Page provides no such authority for such a conclusion. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866
n.3; see also Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that civil actions
under section 717 are governed by the same principles applied in section 703(a) claims). In
addition, commentators have criticized courts' application of Page in section 704(a) claims.
See Essary & Friedman, supra note 20, at 135-36 (noting the courts' reliance on Page when
assessing claims under Section 704(a) is misplaced because Page was not a retaliation
claim); Lidge, supra note 20, at 360-63 (arguing that Page's reliance on Supreme Court
decisions for the proposition that only ultimate employment actions are proscribed under
Title VII is misplaced).
69. 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997).
70. Id. at 243.
71. Id. at241.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 242.
Id.

76. Id. at 243. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
employer breached the settlement agreement. Id. at 245. Subsequently, in Von Gunten, the
court specifically noted that its holding in Munday did not stand for the proposition that
adverse actions must be ultimate employment decisions. Von Gunten v. Md., 243 F.3d 858,
865 (4th Cir. 2001).

330

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:2

condition, or privilege of employment.7
Subsequently, in Boone v. Goldin, s the Fourth Circuit addressed a
plaintiff s claim that she was retaliated against by being assigned to work a
more stressful position in a wind tunnel after settling an EEO complaint.79
Citing to Page and distinguishing the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth concerning what constitutes a "tangible
employment action," the court noted that the plaintiffs claim of additional
stress was insufficient to establish that the working conditions changed
sufficiently to demonstrate that her reassignment violated Title VII's antiretaliation provision."
E.

The Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit narrowly construes the adverse action element in
claims brought under section 704(a) by consistently concluding that Title
VII is intended to address only ultimate employment decisions such as
hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating, and is
not intended to address every decision an employer may make which could
have some tangential effect on an employee's terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.8 2
77. Munday 126 F.3d at 243. One panel member dissented and argued that the
employer took an adverse action against the plaintiff by fostering a work environment so
intolerable that it resulted in the plaintiff being compelled to quit. Id. at 246 (Heaney, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
78. 178 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 255.
80. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
81. Boone, 178 F.3d at 255-56; see also Gilyard v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 208 F.3d 209,
No. 97-2362, 2000 WL 265621, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000). ("Employees are not
'guaranteed a working environment free of stress ....
[dlissatisfaction with work
assignments, a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working
conditions."') (quoting Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994). The court
acknowledged that while Carterinvolved a discharge claim in violation of section 703(a),
its conclusion applied equally to retaliation claims brought under section 704(a). Gilyard,
2000 WL 265621, at *2.
82. See Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (assigning additional
job duties did not impact salary, and thus did not comprise an ultimate employment
decision); Burger v. Cent. Apt. Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying a
lateral transfer, which would have no impact on compensation or benefits, is not an ultimate
employment action under section 704(a)); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N.
Tex., 139 F.3d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that rude treatment by an employer
following a complaint of sexual harassment did not constitute ultimate employment action);
Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that denial of training or
consideration for promotion, and adverse working conditions do not constitute ultimate
employment actions under section 704(a)); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officer's
Assoc., 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that three printed references in an employer
newsletter stating that plaintiff had filed EEOC charge did not constitute retaliation). But
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In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,83 the plaintiff alleged that after
complaining about sexual harassment, she experienced retaliation by her
supervisor and co-workers when, among other things: (1) after she went
home sick, her supervisors went to her home to instruct her to return to
work and report to the medical department if her illness was work-related;
(2) she was reprimanded for not being at her work station when at the time,
she was reporting workplace hostilities to the employer's human resources
department; (3) her supervisors and co-workers were hostile, ignored her,
made verbal slights toward her, and broke into her locker and stole her
tools; (4) her supervisor threatened to terminate her; (5) her work was
reviewed more critically and, as a result, she was denied a pay increase;
and (6) she was threatened with discipline for alleged work deficiencies
when her performance had previously been praised by the same
individuals. 4 In district court, the plaintiff prevailed in her retaliation
claim and was awarded compensatory damages totaling $50,000.8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the above-cited
actions do not constitute ultimate employment decisions because they "lack
consequence," and therefore concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish
86
that she experienced an adverse employment action. The court stated that
"[t]o hold otherwise would be... [an unwarranted expansion of] the
definition of 'adverse employment action' to include events such as
disciplinary filings, supervisor's reprimands, and even poor performance
by the employee-anything which might jeopardize employment in the
future. 87 The court also stated:
Doubtless, some of these actions may have had a tangential effect
on conditions of employment; but, as in... [plaintiff's] case, an
ultimate employment decision had not occurred. The employee
could only prove examples of the "many interlocutory or mediate
decisions having no immediate effect upon employment
conditions" which therefore were "not intended to fall within the
direct proscriptions... of Title VII." '
see Walsdorf v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1988) (reassigning a police
officer from street duties to a desk job with same pay and benefits, but reporting to a
secretary, removing special radio from vehicle, excluding officer from a meeting, preventing
officer from attending a seminar, and ordering officer from the scene of an accident
supported a finding of retaliation).
83. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997)
84. Id. at 705-06.
85. Id. at 704.
86. Id. at 708.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (9th Cir. 1981)). But see Capaci v.
Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 665 (5th Cir. 1983) (documenting "unusual"
occurrences amounting to multiple instances of discipline in plaintiff s personnel file, which
supported a finding of retaliatory harassment).
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The court compared the text of section 704(a) to sections 703(a)(1)
and (a)(2), and reasoned that while section 703(a)(1) limited unlawful
discrimination to negative employment actions related to the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, section 703(a)(2) was more broad
because it precluded discrimination that "would deprive" or "tend to
deprive" an employee."
Noting that section 704(a) only referred to
"discrimination" and did not mention any of the "vague harms" listed in
section 703(a)(2), the court concluded that the plain language of section
704(a) should be read to exclude vague harms, and only include "ultimate
employment decisions" set forth in section 703(a)(1). °
F.

The Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit requires that a negative employment action must
constitute material harm in order to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. 91 In Richmond-Hopes v. City of Cleveland,92 the plaintiff
89. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708-09; see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
90. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709. One panel member vigorously dissented, stating that
"[c]orrectly interpreted, § 704(a) affords an employee an independent hostile work
environment retaliatory discrimination cause of action upon which she may recover in a
proper case regardless of the outcome of her § 703 sex discrimination and constructive
discharge claims." Id. at 710 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissenting panel member also
stated that:
The majority's holding that an employee's failure to convince a trier of fact that
she is entitled to relief under § 703 because of sex discrimination and
constructive discharge limits the scope of her cause of action based on
retaliation under § 704(a) is contrary to Congressional intent and departs from
the settled precedents of this court. Moreover it strikes a grievous blow to the
entire enforcement mechanism of Title VII. As this court stated in Pettway v.
Am. Cast Iron Pipe Company... "[t]here can be no doubt about the purpose of
§ 704(a). In unmistakable language it is to protect the employee who utilizes
the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights. The Act will be frustrated
if the employer may unilaterally determine the truth or falsity of charges and
take independent action."
Id. at 715 (citation omitted) (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005
(5th Cir. 1969)). The dissenting panel member concluded by noting that the panel
majority's reliance on Page was misplaced. Id. at 717. He stated that, while the Fourth
Circuit may have stated that mediate decisions are not actionable in Page, this statement
does not preclude an action based on retaliatory harassment when the Supreme Court has
held that harassment which is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment is actionable under Title VII. Id.
91. See Jeffries v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99-4151, 2001 WL 845486, at *7 (6th Cir.
July 20, 2001) (upholding a jury finding of retaliation and noting that the failure to promote
constitutes adverse action under the circuit's materiality standard); Byrd v. Stone, 202 F.3d
267, No. 97-1841, 2000 WL 32042, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000) (receiving a lower
performance evaluation, which affected potential inclusion on the list of employees eligible
for promotion, constituted material harm to a term, condition, or privilege of employment
and stated a claim of retaliation); Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.
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alleged that after accusing her supervisor of sexual harassment, the
supervisor altered the plaintiff's job responsibilities by: (1) denying her
overtime; (2) reassigning her to a more dangerous assignment for which
she was not qualified; (3) isolating her from the department by ignoring
her; (4) referring to her as a "bitch" behind her back; and (5) encouraging
her co-workers to ostracize her. 93 The Sixth Circuit noted that:
[An] "[a]dverse employment action" must typically constitute a
"materially adverse change in the terms of... employment,"
such as "termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material

loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities,
94
or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.

Citing Kocsis, the court stated that diminished employment
responsibilities could constitute a material adverse job action; however, the
plaintiff's responsibilities in this case did not materially change because
she was immediately pulled off the more dangerous assignment and was
granted overtime.95 Concerning plaintiffs allegations of workplace
1999) (holding that a lowered performance appraisal and threat to transfer or discharge the
plaintiff did not constitute adverse actions where threats were not made by a person who
could affect transfer or discharge); Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1999)
(receiving a lower performance evaluation did not comprise an adverse action under section
704(a) of Title VII). In Primes, the Sixth Circuit further opined:
If every low evaluation or other action by an employer that makes an employee
unhappy or resentful were considered an adverse action, Title VII would be
triggered by supervisor criticism or even facial expressions indicating
displeasure. Paranoia in the workplace would replace the prima facie case as a
basis for a Title VII cause of action.
Id.; see also Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987) (failing to document a
sick leave and temporary transfer from a Secretary III to a lower graded Secretary 11
position did not result in any change in pay or benefits and therefore did not state a claim of
retaliation).
92. 168 F.3d 490, No. 97-3595, 1998 WL 808222, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1998).
93. Id.
94. Id. at *7 (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir.
1996)); see also Birone v. Indian River Sch., 145 F.3d 1329, No. 97-3212, 1998 WL
199791, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 1998) (investigating the plaintiff for alleged sexual
misconduct did not form the basis of a retaliation claim, as no disciplinary action resulted).
In Birone, the court also suggested that, in applying a materiality standard, a fifteen-day
suspension "probably does not qualify as an adverse employment action either." Id.
95. Richmond-Hopes, 1998 WL 808222, at *8.In Kocsis, the Sixth Circuit concluded,
in the context of analyzing a prima facie case of discrimination (and not retaliation) under
the ADA, that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how her lateral transfer was a "materially
adverse change in the terms of her employment." Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 885. The decision
noted that in prior cases, the court had found that a reassignment without a change in one's
salary or hours worked did not constitute an adverse action. Id. In applying the materially
adverse requirement to plaintiff s claim, the court concluded that the plaintiff enjoyed the
same rate of pay, which had actually increased, and that her job duties did not materially
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hostility and isolation, the Sixth Circuit stated: "Retaliatory harassment
may be actionable as long as the adverse employment action suffered is
material. Therefore, as with hostile environment sexual harassment,
retaliatory harassment by a supervisor that occurs prior to any tangible
employment decision must be severe or pervasive to be actionable. 9 6 The
court, though, did not address whether the plaintiff endured actionable
retaliatory harassment, and instead, concluded that the employer
established the affirmative defense set forth by the Supreme Court in its
decisions in BurlingtonIndustries v. Ellerth97 and Faragherv. City of Boca
Raton.9 8

Subsequently, in Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court,99 the Sixth

Circuit analyzed a section 704(a) claim of retaliatory harassment by
applying the harassment analysis applied to section 703(a) claims,
including principles of vicarious liability and the affirmative defense
°° In Morris, the
addressed in Ellerth and Faragher.1
plaintiff alleged that
her supervisor, a county road engineer, subjected her to retaliatory
harassment after she notified a county judge of harassment.01 The plaintiff
alleged that her supervisor: (1) visited and called her on numerous
occasions, even after being warned not to by the judge; (2) sat in his truck
staring and making faces at her while she was at work; (3) followed her
home and gave her "the finger" out of his window when she arrived home;
(4) destroyed the television set she watched while at work; and (5) threw
roofing nails onto her driveway on several occasions. 02 The Sixth Circuit
noted that while other circuits have held employers liable for co-worker
retaliatory harassment, no circuit has addressed whether a supervisor can be
liable for retaliatory harassment since Faragher and Ellerth were
decided. 3' Relying on common law rules of statutory construction, the
court concluded that harassment is actionable not only for claims of
discrimination under section 703(a), but also for claims based on section
704(a).' 04 The Sixth Circuit then stated:
change. Id. at 886-87.
96. Richmond-Hopes, 1998 WL 808222 at *9; see also Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys.,
171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that evidence the plaintiff was isolated
from other employees, who were instructed not to talk or interact with him, supported a jury
finding of retaliation).
97. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
98. 524 U.S. 775 (1998); see infra Part IV (discussing retaliatory harassment as a cause
of action).
99. 201 F.3d 784 (6thCir. 2000).
100. Id. at 792.
101. Id. at786-87.
102. Id. at 793.
103. Id. at 791. The court noted that it was taking no position with respect to liability for
retaliatory harassment by co-workers. Id. at 791 n.8.
104. Id. at 792.
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[J]ust as an employer has the opportunity to prove an affirmative
defense to severe or pervasive sexual harassment by a supervisor,
it follows that an employer should also have the opportunity to
prove an affirmative defense to severe or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor. Under agency principles, retaliatory
harassment does not, in and of itself, constitute a "tangible
employment action." Therefore, an employer is entitled to the
same affirmative defense for retaliatory harassment that it is
entitled to for sexual harassment....
The court further stated:
In sum, we today modify our standard for proving a primafacie
case of Title VII retaliation. A plaintiff must now prove that: (1)
she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of
protected rights was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter
took adverse employment action against the plaintiff, or the
plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal
activity and the adverse
connection between the protected
106
employment action or harassment.
In applying the above standard, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court, concluding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case
of retaliation based on retaliatory harassment by a supervisor which did not
result in a tangible employment action. 1°7 The court further held that the
employer should be given the opportunity to establish the affirmative
08
defense outlined in Ellerth.1
G.

The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit also requires that negative employment actions
allege material harm to state a cognizable claim of retaliation under the
applicable anti-discrimination statutes.'0 9 In Ribando v. United Airlines,
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id.at 793.
108. Id.
109. See Barker v. YMCA of Racine, No. 01-1109, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19826, at
*10-1 1 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (concluding that questioning the plaintiff about an EEOC
charge, while making the plaintiff uncomfortable, did not rise to the level of a cognizable
adverse employment action); Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118-19
(7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that under an ADA claim of retaliation, neither the accepted
claims of a verbal and written warning, nor four unaccepted claims constituted material
adverse actions because the warnings and other workplace allegations did not result in any
tangible occupational consequences); Hoffman-Dombrowski v. Arlington Int'l Racecourse,
Inc., 254 F.3d 644, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that changing a work schedule, secretly
videotaping the plaintiff, issuing the plaintiff a warning for unauthorized persons in the
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Inc., the Seventh Circuit articulated the standard by stating:
Although we have defined the term broadly, the adverse job
action must be "materially" adverse, meaning more than "mere
inconvenience or an alteration in job responsibilities." We have
explained, "a materially adverse change might be indicated by a
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease
in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of
benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or
other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.""' °
The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs hostile
environment claim, noting that while retaliatory harassment was actionable
if sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the
working environment and create an abusive work atmosphere, the
employer's action in investigating a charge of harassment against her was
proper and fell "far short" of creating a severe or pervasive working
environment.'1 '
However, in Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co.," 2 the plaintiff alleged,
among other things, that shortly after filing an EEO complaint alleging
harassment based on national origin, his employer retaliated against him
by: (1) suspending him for five days; (2) falsely informing the police that
he had threatened his supervisor with a gun, which resulted in his being
physically and emotionally harmed by the police; and (3) denying him
overtime after returning from his suspension." 3 On summary judgment,
allegations (1) and (3) above were addressed by the court without
discussing the adverse action element, and the false police report allegation
was dismissed because it was not employment related." 4 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and, regarding allegation (2),
concluded:
Although it is true that... [the plaintiff] may have some state
law cause of action against his employer for making a false
police report against him, the availability of a state law claim
manager's office, and ordering the plaintiff to spend more time with one of the
discriminating officials did not constitute material adverse actions); Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d
546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that bare allegations of demeaning assignments,
verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities and being assigned tasks which are
doomed to failure do not comprise material adverse actions sufficient to survive summary
judgment); Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (receiving a
"letter of concern" following an investigation of an allegation of harassment against the
plaintiff did not constitute a material adverse action under section 704(a)).
110. Ribando, 200 F.3d at 510-11 (citations omitted) (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)).
111. Id. at511.
112. 183 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999).
113. Id. at 600-601.
114. Id. at 604.
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does not eliminate... [the plaintiff's] Title VII retaliation claim.
McDonnell and Veprinski make clear that the language of the
Title VII retaliation provision is broad enough to contemplate
circumstances where employers might take actions that are not
ostensibly employment related against a current employee in
retaliation for that employee asserting his title VII rights....
[The plaintiff] has presented enough evidence that... [the
employer] took such an action only moments after... [he]
informed his supervisors that he had filed charge of
discrimination ten days earlier. Although not quite as dramatic as
the example we gave in McDonnell of the employer shooting the
employee, a false report to the police that [the plaintiff] was
armed and laying in wait outside the plant could certainly be
construed as a retaliatory action meant to discourage... [the
plaintiff] from pursuing his claim." 5
In Sweeney v. West, 1 6 the plaintiff alleged that she was unfairly
reprimanded, given two letters of counseling, and forced to endure a hostile
environment in retaliation for her prior EEO activity.n 7 The Seventh
Circuit found that these actions did not constitute "materially adverse
actions."'" 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit stated that:
Title VII's "retaliation provision," ... does not say exactly what
constitutes retaliation and what doesn't, but obviously there are
limits. The undoubted purpose of Title VII's prohibition against
retaliation is to prevent employers from discouraging complaints
or otherwise chilling the exercise of an employee's rights. A dirty
look or the silent treatment might be as effective at discouraging
complaints as demoting an employee,.., but the question
remains whether each is enough to prompt a federal case. The
demotion certainly is; the other examples clearly not. The
difference is not complicated-Title VII's retaliation provisions
make it unlawful to "discriminate" against an employee because
he has made a charge of discrimination. Common sense and the
examples used in the statutes principal section [section 703
(a)] ...exclude instances of different treatment that have little or
no effect on an employee's job.... At most ....[the plaintiff]
has demonstrated instances in which she was unfairly
reprimanded for conduct she either did not engage in or should

115. Id. at 606. In a successive appeal, the Seventh Circuit clarified its prior decision
and noted that a truthful, non-discriminatory report to the police should not subject an
employer to liability, as it would deter employers from taking "prudent action to protect
themselves and others in the workplace." Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 241 F.3d 589, 593
(7th Cir. 2001).
116. 149 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at553.
118. Id. at556.
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not have been responsible for. Absent some tangible job
consequence accompanying those reprimands, we decline to
broaden the definition of adverse employment action to include
them.... If we interpreted these simple personal actions as
materially adverse, we would be sending a message to employers
that even the slightest nudge or admonition (however wellintentioned) given to an employee can be the subject of a federal
lawsuit; a simple statutory prohibition against retaliation would
be turned into a bizarre measure of extra protection for
employees who-though
they might genuinely need
counseling-at one point complained about their employer. We
also would be deterring employers from documenting
performance difficulties, for fear that they would be sued for
doing so. Employees would be left in the dark as to how they
could improve their work performance, and employers would be
less able to establish the fact that poor performance, rather than
some unlawful motivation, prompted a decision to fire, demote,
etc.119
In McKenzie v. Illinois Department of Transportation,21 0 the plaintiff
alleged that following protected EEO activity, she was retaliated against
when: (1) her supervisor required her to go to the accounting department to
sign for invoices when, prior to her EEO activity, the invoices were
delivered to her office; (2) her supervisor instructed a vendor not to enter
the building where she worked; and (3) her employer instructed her coworkers not to provide affidavits or assist in her litigation. 12 ' The Seventh
Circuit found that when the invoices were no longer delivered to the
plaintiff, her job became more difficult, and this was sufficient to establish
a prima facie case of retaliation."' However, the Seventh Circuit also
noted that in certain circumstances, if an employer ordered other employees
to not talk to a plaintiff, such action could constitute a retaliatory adverse
action.'3 In addition, the court determined that the employer articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, so the court did not
address whether the plaintiffs allegation constituted an adverse action. 1 4
Finally, the court noted that while the term "adverse action," in claims of
retaliation, has been defined broadly, allegation (3) above did not constitute
119. Id. at 556-57 (citations omitted).
120. 92 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
121. Id. at477-78.
122. Id. at 484.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
the plaintiff stated a claim of retaliation when she was removed from her office, placed at a
desk in front of her supervisor's office, had her phone, business cards, and listing in
professional directories and publications removed, and was laterally transferred to a
department that was unsure what to do with her).
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an adverse action under section 704(a), and this allegation was better left to
resolution by court rules and not Title VII.'5
In Rabinovitz v. Pena,1 26 the plaintiff alleged that after engaging in
EEO activity, his subsequent performance evaluation was downgraded
from "exceptional" to "fully successful," and he experienced a number of
workplace restrictions, namely: (1) he was allowed to discuss only business
with his co-workers; (2) he had to report to his supervisor every time he
entered and left the department; (3) his breaks were limited; (4) he could no
longer utilize a secretary for typing; (5) he was denied permission to utilize
the office flex-time policy; and (6) he was told to resign if he did not like
such treatment. 127 The Seventh Circuit noted that "a materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive
than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. ' l8 The
court concluded that a lowered performance evaluation was not materially

adverse because it did not alter his job responsibilities or his
compensation. 29 The court then concluded that even if the lower
evaluation score may have cost the plaintiff a $600 bonus, the bonus was
not an entitlement, and its loss therefore did not constitute a material
adverse action. 30 Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the job
125. McKenzie, 92 F.3d at 485-86.

126. 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 486.
128. Id. at 488 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132,
136 (7th Cir. 1993)).
129. Id.; see also Krause v. City of La Crosse, 246 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that a letter of reprimand was not an adverse action unless accompanied by
some other action, and that moving the plaintiff to a back office was not adverse when the
plaintiff requested to move); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding that plaintiff's retaliation claim based on the receipt of a lower performance
evaluation fails absent evidence of injury due to the lower rating); Smart v. Ball State Univ.,
89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that undeserved poor evaluations, without
more, does not constitute an adverse action). In Silk, the court also concluded that the
plaintiff's allegations that he was both precluded from pursuing secondary employment and
suspended five days constituted adverse actions under the ADA's anti-retaliation provision.
Silk, 194 F.3d at 800; see also Cullom v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 2000)
(over-inflating a performance rating to prevent an employee from being placed on a
performance improvement plan does not comprise adverse action).
130. Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488-89; see also Stutder v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs., 263 F.3d 698,
702-03 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a lateral transfer of the plaintiff to the business
office was not an adverse action without a loss of benefits); Williams v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a transfer to a different sales
territory adversely impacting commission income, and deemed to be a lateral position with
no significant changes to working conditions or terms of employment, did not constitute an
adverse action). The court in Williams noted that it did not want to broaden the definition to
include such actions, as "[o]therwise every trivial personnel action that an irritable, chip-onthe-shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit." Id. at
274; see also Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (transferring the
plaintiff to an undesired position with arguably diminished duties comprises a "dubious"
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restrictions were "mere inconveniences" which did not "relate to plaintiffs
job responsibilities or
job title," and thus did not constitute adverse
31

employment actions.
In Knox v. State of Indiana,132 the plaintiff alleged that she endured a

campaign of co-worker harassment in the form of vicious gossip following
protected EEO activity. 33 The Seventh Circuit concluded that retaliatory
harassment could constitute an adverse employment action under section
704(a) if the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive, and if the
employer knew about the co-worker's actions and failed to correct the
offensive behavior.1 34 In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit
noted that:
[A]dverse actions come in many shapes and sizes. No one would
question the retaliatory effect of many actions that put the
complainant in a more unfriendly working environment: actions
like moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a
dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available support
services (like secretarial help or a desktop computer), or cutting
off challenging assignments. Nothing indicates why a different
form of retaliation- namely, retaliating against a complainant by
permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her
rights under Title Vi--does not fall within the statute. The law
deliberately does not take a "laundry list" approach to retaliation,

adverse action in a claim of retaliation when the employee left position after one month);
Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a transfer
providing better opportunities, the voluntary end to a training program, and allegations that
the supervisor rummaged through the desk and listened to phone calls did not comprise
adverse actions in a claim of retaliation); Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications,
Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1112 (7th Cir. 1998) (removing plaintiff's EEO responsibilities does
not constitute a materially adverse action where his salary, grade, and office remained the
same). The Seventh Circuit has also concluded that absent material harm, a lateral transfer
does not constitute an adverse action in a claim of discrimination (not retaliation) under the
ADEA. See, e.g., Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that a lateral transfer resulting in a new job title and the employee reporting to a
former subordinate may have "bruised an ego" but did not constitute an adverse action);
Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust, Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1993)
(changing title from Assistant Vice President and Branch Manager to Loan Officer at
another branch, without further action, did not constitute adverse action); Spring v.
Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 1989) (transferring the principle to a
co-principle job at another school with an increase in pay did not constitute adverse action,
despite the public perception and humiliation associated with being a co-principle).
131. Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 489.
132. 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
133. Id. at 1331.
134. Id. at 1334.; see also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th
Cir. 1998) (concluding that three obscene phone calls and paperwork missing from a locker
did not constitute an adverse employment action, especially when the plaintiff presented no
evidence that the employer knew about the phone calls).
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because unfortunately its
135 forms are as varied as the human
imagination will permit.
H. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit requires that adverse actions following EEO
activity allege either material harm to a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, or constitute an ultimate employment action in order to state a

claim of retaliation under section 704(a).13 6 In Manning v. Metropoliten
Life Insurance, Inc., 37 the plaintiffs alleged that their attempts to report
harassment by their supervisor were ignored, that their supervisor

subsequently threatened them, and that they experienced hostility,

indifference and ostracism after reporting the harassment. 138 The Eighth
Circuit concluded that these allegations did not comprise an adverse
employment action, and in so doing, stated, "The retaliation provision...

[of Title VII] does not itself contain language requiring a materially
adverse employment action in order to state a claim. This requirement is
inferred from the basic prohibition of employment discrimination set forth
in... [section 703(a) of Title VI]. '

139

The court then concluded:

135. Knox,93 F.3d at 1334 (citations omitted); see also Parkins v. Civil Constr. of Ill.,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that shunning by co-workers could
constitute adverse action so long as the plaintiff established material harm).
136. See, e.g., LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that a performance rating noting the plaintiff "consistently meets expectations"
does not comprise materially adverse action); Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., Inc., 216
F.3d 707, 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that an employee who was told to "pack her
bags" and "leave the building" and was later reassured she was not terminated does not
comprise material adverse action); Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391, 395 (8th Cir.
2000) (assigning a correctional officer to a "bubble" following EEO activity, when normally
such duties are rotated, constituted material adverse action); Coffman v., Tracker Marine,
L.P., 141 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming a jury verdict of retaliation where
the plaintiff was materially harmed by a reduction in duties, reduction in number of
employees plaintiff supervised, an inability to take off holidays, and evidence that the
alleged harasser jumped back in the hallway when the plaintiff walked by); Chock v.
Northwest Airlines, 113 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that neither an employer's
alleged interference in the plaintiff's pursuit of an MBA nor forcing the plaintiff to end a
living arrangement with a direct supervisor constituted material adverse actions); Kim v.
Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1061 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that discipline, reduction
of duties, and negative personnel reports that required the plaintiff attend remedial training
were sufficient employment actions to establish an adverse action in a retaliation claim);
Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming ajury verdict of
retaliation where the plaintiff was transferred to a position which, though providing more
money, removed supervisory duties and presented fewer opportunities for salary increases
and advancement).
137. 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997)
138. Id. at 688-89.
139. Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
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Absent evidence of some more tangible change in duties or
working conditions that constituted a material employment
disadvantage, we must agree with the district court that... [the
plaintiffs] did not present evidence sufficient to demonstrate any
adverse employment action that constitutes the sort of ultimate
employment decision intended to be actionable under Title VII. 4
In LePique v. Hove,14 1 the Eighth Circuit affirmed its prior precedent
that a decision to transfer or a refusal to transfer an employee is not an
adverse action if the transfer does not result in a change in the employee's
pay, benefits, or working conditions. 42 Notably, in his concurring opinion,
Judge Heaney noted that:
[T]he rule... is, in my view, simply wrong. An employer's
retaliatory refusal to transfer an employee is an adverse
employment action regardless whether the position sought
involves the same duties, pay and benefits. After all, where a
person lives and works often is more important than the salary or
benefits he/she receives, and refusing the transfer results in more
than "mere inconvenience."... I recognize
43 that I am bound by
our circuit's precedent, and thus I concur.
In Flannery v. Transworld Airlines, Inc.,' 44 the plaintiff had alleged
that: (1) she was ordered to remove a fan from her desk; (2) her work hours
were changed; (3) she was reprimanded for a dress code violation; (4) her
parking space was relocated further from her work station; (5) she was
admonished for liberally awarding frequent flyer miles to customers; (6)
she was reassigned to another work station; and (7) approximately 300

140. Id.
141. 217 F.3d 1012 (8thCir. 2000).
142. Id. at 1013-14; see, e.g., Spears v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850,
853-54 (8th Cir. 2000) (transferring an employee to another department and issuing the
employee only a "successful" rating on a performance evaluation did not allege materially
adverse actions); Hoffman v. Rubin, 193 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a
proposed transfer from St. Paul to Chicago was not an adverse action where pay, rank, and
benefits would remain unaltered); Lederberger v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (8th Cir.
1997) (reassigning the plaintiff to a different position that was more stressful and required
her to supervise more "problem" employees was not the kind of "ultimate employment
action" meant to be actionable under Title VII's discrimination or retaliation provisions);
Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997) (receiving a lower
score on an evaluation and requiring the plaintiff to move his residence to remain employed
were insufficient adverse actions to establish claim of retaliation); Harlston v. McDonnell
Douglas Co., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the involuntary
reassignment to a new, more stressful position with fewer duties, but with no change to
salary or benefit level, comprised a "mere inconvenience" and did not allege any material
harm).
143. LePique,217 F.3d at 1014.
144. 160 F.3d 425 (8thCir. 1998).
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complimentary letters were removed from her personnel file.' 45 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that while the plaintiffs
working conditions changed after she filed a grievance, there was no
showing that such changes amounted to a material change to her
employment relationship. 146 However, in Cross v. Cleaver, 47 the Eighth
Circuit announced that where a supervisor with the power to hire, fire,
demote, transfer, and take other actions on an employee utilizes his or her
authority to retaliate against an employee for filing a claim of sexual
harassment, the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that the employer
knew or should have known about the retaliatory harassment to hold the
employer liable for retaliation under section 704(a). 48 In Cross, the
plaintiff established that her supervisor initiated investigations, transfers,
and suspensions after she filed a complaint of sexual harassment against
him. 14 9
In Smith v. St. Louis University,50 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
providing negative references to two prospective employers in retaliation
for filing a complaint of harassment constituted an adverse employment
action within the meaning of section 704(a).' 5' Citing the Third Circuit
decision in Charlton v. ParamusBoard of Education,5 2 the Eighth Circuit
concluded that a negative reference given to a potential employer based on
retaliatory animus could result in liability under Title VII! 3
I.

The Ninth Circuit

In Ray v. Henderson, 54 the Ninth Circuit broadly construed the
adverse action element of a primafacie case of retaliation by adopting the
EEOC's definition of what constitutes an adverse action. 5 In Ray, after
145. Id. at 427.
146. Id. at 428.
147. 142 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 1998).
148. Id. at 1074.
149. Id. at 1063.
150. 109 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1997).
151. Id. at 1266.
152. 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
153. Smith, 142 F.3d at 1266 (citing Charlton,25 F.3d at 200).
154. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000)
155. Id. at 1242-43. Subsequent decisions in the Ninth Circuit have followed the
decision in Ray. See, e.g., Alexander v. Principi, Nos. 99-55755 & 00-56252, 2001 WL
894285, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) (following Ray and concluding that harassment can
comprise an adverse employment action in a retaliation claim); Little v. Windermere
Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that under the rule of Ray,
reduction in a guaranteed monthly base salary from $3000 to $2000 constituted an adverse
action); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
under the rule in Ray, co-worker ostracism, use of the full ninety day period to process
worker's compensation claim, participating in employee discussions regarding harassment,
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the plaintiff complained about the treatment of women at the postal facility,
the supervisor eliminated the employee involvement program and flex-time
start policies, instituted lock-down procedures, and reduced the plaintiff's
workload and pay disproportionately to other co-workers. 5 6 The Ninth
Circuit, in reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff's retaliation claim, first recognized a split among the circuits as to
what comprises a cognizable adverse employment action in a claim of
retaliation.157 The court then reviewed prior decisions in the Ninth Circuit
and concluded that the adverse action element should be construed
broadly.' 58 The Ninth Circuit noted that its broad interpretation of the
adverse action element is in accord with decisions in the First, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.' 59 The court rejected the defendant's
argument that it should adopt the "ultimate employment action"
requirement, as articulated in decisions from the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits. 160 The court then noted that the tangible employment actions
listed in Ellerth focused on the type of actions that would subject an
employer to vicarious liability for unlawful harassment, and thus rejected
the defendant's contention that Ellerth established a standard for what
constitutes an adverse action in a retaliation context.' 6 ' The Ninth Circuit
working with a friend of the alleged harasser, a disputed evaluation, and difficulty securing
vacation time did not constitute adverse actions); Dimitrov v. Seattle Times Co., No. 9836156, 2000 WL 1228995, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2000) (concluding that the employer's
failure to include the plaintiff in congratulatory letters and its delay in scheduling coworkers when the plaintiff called in sick did not constitute adverse actions); Ju v. Sharp
Microelectronics Tech., Inc., 243 F.3d 548, No. 00-35308, 2000 WL 1801380, at *1 (9th
Cir. July 28, 2000) (finding that allegations of the employer disturbing the employee's son's
chess preparation, neglecting the employee's tenth anniversary, requiring supervisory
approval for the employee to communicate in writing to fellow employees, and making a
negative comment about the employee in a trip report did not constitute adverse actions
under Ray).
156. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1237-39.
157. Id. at 1240.
158. Id. at 1241; see Specht v. Dalton, 202 F.3d 279, No. 97-56744, 1999 WL 1038225,
at *4-5 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999) (concluding that the receipt of a letter of caution, an
advanced notice of disciplinary action, a letter of reprimand, and forcing a plaintiff to take
an annual leave comprised adverse employment actions); Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (characterizing a transfer from the swing shift to
the day shift as "barely-if at all" an adverse action, as the plaintiff "was not demoted, or
put in a worse job, or given additional responsibilities," and in fact enjoyed the day shift);
Bouman v. Black, 940 F.2d 1211, 1229 (9th Cir. 1991) (losing the opportunity to compete
for a transfer constituted an adverse employment action under section 704(a)); Yartzoff v.
Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (having job duties transferred and receiving
undeserved performance evaluations constitute adverse actions under section 704(a)). But
see Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Co., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1997) (transferring the
employee to a more dangerous job site does not comprise an adverse action).
159. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240-41.
160. Id. at 1242.
161. Id. at 1242 n.5.
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also rejected the approach utilized by other circuits which requires that
adverse actions materially affect the terms and conditions of
employment.1 2
The Ninth Circuit noted that the EEOC's Compliance Manual on
Retaliation defines adverse employment action as "any adverse treatment
that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the
63
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."'
Recognizing that EEOC guidelines are not "binding on courts," but that
they "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance," the Ninth Circuit
endorsed the EEOC's deterrence standard. 64 Applying the deterrence
court then concluded that the plaintiff stated a claim of
standard, the
165
retaliation.
In Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc.,66 a
decision not cited in Ray, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that
after filing a complaint of sex discrimination because she was passed over
for promotions to executive management positions, she endured retaliation
when: (1) her subsequent performance rating was adversely affected; (2)
her job responsibilities were reduced; (3) accounts were transferred out of
her jurisdiction as a national accounts manager without notice; (4) she was
excluded from division manager meetings and was not provided necessary
information to perform successfully in her position; (5) her performance
objectives were reduced; and (6) she was offered a series of demotions, the
denial of which impacted future promotional opportunities. 67 The jury
found for the plaintiff on her allegations of sex discrimination and
retaliation, and awarded her back pay, front pay, compensatory emotional
distress damages, and punitive damages exceeding twelve million
The court then reduced the punitive damage award to the
dollars. 6
$300,000 Title VII damage cap, while leaving the remainder of the award
intact.1 9 Among the arguments raised on appeal, the employer asserted
that the above actions did not constitute adverse actions. 70 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, noting:
The purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is to bar
employers from taking actions which could have "a deleterious
effect on the exercise of these rights by others."... Title VII
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1242-43 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13).
Id. at 1243 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
Id. at 1243-44.
212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 501-03.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 506.
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allows employees to freely report actions that they reasonably
believe are discriminatory, even if those actions are in fact
lawful.... Absent a judicial remedy, the type of actions [the
plaintiff] asserts her employer engaged in could discourage other
employees from speaking freely about discrimination. We hold
that the actions.., were sufficient
to constitute retaliation within
71
the meaning of Title VII.
In Fielder v. UAL Corp., 172 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether an
allegation of retaliatory harassment by co-workers was cognizable. 73 After
analyzing decisions in the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, the court
concluded that such a claim was cognizable when the conduct alleged rises
to the level of an adverse employment action.' 74
In Hashimoto v. Dalton,175 the plaintiff argued that a prospective
employer received a negative job reference from her former employer in
retaliation for engaging in EEO activity. 176 The employer argued that
because the prospective employer would not have hired the plaintiff
irrespective of the negative job reference, the plaintiff experienced no
tangible harm. 177 The court disagreed, stating: "We reject the government's
'no harm, no foul' approach. A plaintiff may seek relief for retaliatory
actions taken after her employment ends if 'the alleged discrimination is
related to or arises out of the employment relationship.", 78 The Ninth
Circuit further opined:
[T]he government's argument in this case fails to recognize the
distinction between a violation and the availability of
remedies.... [The employer's] dissemination of the adverse job
reference violated Title VII because it was a "personnel action"
motivated by retaliatory animus. That this unlawful personnel
action turned out to be inconsequential goes to the issue of
damages, not liability ....
Further ....adoption of the government's position would
undermine both the letter and the spirit of Title VII's prohibition

171. Id. at 506-07 (citations omitted).
172. 218 F.3d 973 (9thCir. 2000).
173. Id. at 984-85.
174. Id.
175. 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997).
176. Id. at 673.
177. Id. at 674.
178. Id. at 675 (quoting Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330 (D.C. Cir.
1991)); see also Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 1986)
("[An] 'adverse employment decision' is the closing of the job opening... and the loss of
opportunity even to compete for the position. The plaintiff need not show that she would
have obtained the job, a showing that would be nearly insurmountable at the prima facie
stage and involves factors better marshaled and presented by the defendants.").
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against actions in retaliation for EEO activities. We have
recognized that actions taken in retaliation for the exercise of
Title VII rights can have a "deleterious effect on the exercise of
these rights by others."... Although this particular harm was not
suffered by... [the plaintiff] in the present case because she was
no longer employed by... [her employer], the chilling effect

which... [her supervisor's] retaliatory conduct might have on
the remaining employees under his supervision does counsel
against accepting the government's narrow conception of what
constitutes a "violation" of Title VII. Accordingly, we conclude
that the retaliatory dissemination of a negative employment
reference violates Title VII, even if the negative reference does
decision not to hire the
not affect the prospective employer's
179
victim of the discriminatory action.
J.

The Tenth Circuit

The Tenth Circuit construes the adverse action element of a prima
facie case of retaliation liberally, and it has rejected arguments that adverse
actions should allege material harm to a term, condition, or privilege of
employment in order to state a cognizable claim of retaliation. 8 0 In
179. Hashimoto, 118 F.3d at 676 (citations omitted).
180. See Apgar v. State of Wyo. Highway Patrol, 221 F.3d 1351, No. 99-8029, 2000 WL
1059444, at - 10 (10th Cir. Aug. 2, 2000) (finding that following the resignation of
employment, preparation of a negative final report could impact future employment and
thus comprises an adverse action); Toth v. Gates Rubber, Co., 216 F.3d 1088, No. 99-1017,
2000 WL 796068, at *9 (10th Cir. June 21, 2000) (receiving negative performance
evaluations is an adverse employment action); Corneveaux v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Group, 76
F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a former employee established an adverse
action under ADEA's anti-retaliation provision when she had to "go through several hoops
in order to obtain her severance benefits"); Rutherford v. Am. Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d
1162, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding that an employer's notation on a reference form that
a former employee had filed an EEO charge constituted retaliation). However, even under a
liberal view, not every alleged act of retaliation has been found to comprise an adverse
action. See, e.g., Deflon v. Danka Corp., Inc., 242 F.3d 312, No. 99-2239, 2001 WL 13260,
at *10 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 2001) (concluding that distasteful remarks and shunning, while
unpleasant, did not amount to an adverse employment action); Welder v. Univ. of Okla. Bd.
of Regents, No. 99-6430, 2000 WL 1854132, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (finding that
even under a liberal view, five different actions alleged, taken together, do not comprise an
adverse employment action); Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d 790, 798-99 (10th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that a delay in the receipt of a transfer and dissatisfaction with an evaluation
and the amount of a salary increase do not comprise adverse actions); Richmond v. Okla.
Univ. Bd. of Regents, 162 F.3d 1174, No. 97-5181, 1998 WL 747093, at *3 n.4 (10th Cir.
Oct. 20, 1998) (concluding that an employer's failure to follow through on a gratuitous
promise to assist a former employee with a job search did not constitute adverse action
under section 704(a)); Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1382 (10th Cir. 1998)
(noting that a school district's change in explanation for removing the plaintiff does not
constitute adverse action under Title VII); Fortner v. Rueger, 122 F.3d 40, 41 (10th Cir.
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Trujillo v. New Mexico Department of Corrections,18 the plaintiff alleged
that he was retaliated against when he was denied a transfer to another
position that would have provided him greater responsibility and the ability
to supervise employees. 8 2 The magistrate judge dismissed the plaintiffs
claim because the transfer did not constitute an adverse employment
action.'83 The Tenth Circuit reversed, noting that it liberally construes the
adverse action requirement and that it does not require a loss of monetary
benefits for a plaintiff to establish a claim of retaliation.' 84
While

recognizing that in Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools,'85 the court
previously stated that an involuntary lateral transfer, without more, did not
constitute an adverse employment action, the court found that in Trujillo
the plaintiff would have supervised employees and had greater
responsibilities.1 6 Accordingly, the denial of a transfer in Trujillo was in
effect a denial of a promotion.'8 7
In Jeffries v. Kansas,188 the plaintiff alleged that after complaining
about an incident of sexual harassment by a co-worker, her supervisor
retaliated against her by: (1) informing her that he would no longer
supervise her as a student; (2) threatening not to renew her contract at the
end of the year; and (3) refusing to supervise her for the remainder of the
current contract year. 8 9 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's
retaliation claim concluding that the plaintiff failed to allege material harm
to a term, condition, or privilege of employment.' 90 The Tenth Circuit
reversed, stating that it never recognized that an adverse action must be
material to be actionable and that it has instead taken a case-by-case
approach to ascertain whether a negative employment action is adverse
under the applicable statute.1tg The court concluded that the plaintiffs
1997), affg sub nom Former v. Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 1252, 1268 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding
that predictable office tension following a charge of discrimination was not sufficient to
constitute adverse action); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 896 (10th Cir.
1994) (receiving a "meets expectations" rating on a new evaluation system was not an
adverse action).
181. 182 F.3d 933, No. 98-2143, 1999 WL 194151, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1999).
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id. at *3.
184. Id.
185. 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a lateral transfer is not an
adverse action where the salary, benefits, and job responsibilities remained the same and the
only drawback of the new position was a longer commute).
186. Trujillo, 1999 WL 194151, at *3-4.
187. Id. at *5.
188. 147 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1998).
189. Id. at 1226-27.
190. Id. at 1231.
191. Id. at 1232. But see Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that a teacher who was the target of several unsubstantiated agediscriminatory remarks, was threatened that she would be placed on a performance
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192
allegations stated a prima facie claim of retaliation.
In Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College,193 the plaintiff alleged that
after reporting sexual harassment, she: (1) was given inferior office
equipment and fewer responsibilities and (2) endured harassment by her
co-workers who treated her badly, left her out of office communications,
and set her up to fail in her new position.' 94 The Tenth Circuit recognized
that while a campaign of retaliatory harassment by co-workers does not
constitute an adverse employment action under section 704(a) in the
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, the First and Seventh Circuits have
recognized such a cause of action. 9 5 Recognizing the remedial nature of
Title VII and that the adverse action element of a prima facie case of
retaliation should be defined liberally on a case-by-case basis, the court
concluded that "retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may
'adverse employment action' for purposes of a retaliation
constitute
196
claim."
In Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet,197 the Tenth Circuit concluded that
malicious prosecution against a former employee can constitute an adverse
employment action.'9 8 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the employer's
assertion that its role in encouraging a criminal forgery and theft
prosecution against the plaintiff was not an adverse action because it was
not linked to an employer-employee relationship.' 9 9 Further, the court
stated that it would be illogical for coverage to be extended to former
employees, but then limited adverse actions to an existing employeremployee relationship. 20 The Tenth Circuit also stated:
[W]e do not agree with... [the employer's] assertion that
retaliatory prosecution is not connected with present or future
employment. While providing a tainted employment reference
may have a more direct effect on a former employee's future
employment prospects, criminal prosecution will also have an

improvement plan, and was required to bring in a doctor's note to verify illness failed to

satisfy the court's definition of a "materially adverse employment action").
192. Jeffries, 147 F.3d at 1234.
193. 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).

194. Id. at 1257-58.
195. Id. at 1264. CompareMunday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th

Cir. 1997), Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997), and Manning
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 693 (8th Cir. 1997), with Knox v. Indiana, 93
F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996), and Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir.
1994).
196. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264.
197. 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996).

198. Id. at 986.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (holding that limiting

section 704 to current employees would undermine the effectiveness of the statute).

350

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4:2

obvious impact. A criminal trial, such as that to which... [the
plaintiff] was subjected, is necessarily public and therefore
carries a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation,
and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects.
K. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit broadly construes the adverse action element of
a prima facie case of retaliation. 0 2 In Wideman v.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,23
the plaintiff alleged that she endured a series of negative employment
actions after engaging in EEO activity.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that: (1) she was improperly listed as a no-show on her off day and when
she brought it to her supervisor's attention, he forced her to work without a
lunch break; (2) she received two written reprimands and a one-day
suspension; (3) her supervisor solicited co-workers for negative statements
about her; (4) after inquiring as to why she was not listed on the work
schedule, a manager threatened to shoot her in the head; and (5) after
suffering an allergic reaction at work, management needlessly delayed
authorization for her to seek medical treatment.2 °5 The employer argued
that none of these actions constituted an adverse employment action under
section 704(a). 2° 6

The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the split in the

circuits, stating: "We join the majority of circuits which have addressed the
issue and hold that Title VII's protection against retaliatory discrimination
extends to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employment
decisions. 2 7 The court analyzed the text of section 704(a) in light of the
broad, remedial goals of Title VII, and concluded that:
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits' contrary position is inconsistent
with the plain language of... [section 704 (a)] ....Read in the

light of ordinary understanding, the term "discriminate" is not
limited to "ultimate employment decisions." Moreover, our plain
201. Berry, 74 F.3d at 986.
202. See Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Orange County, Fla., 242 F.3d 946, 1015,
(11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that two allegations did not comprise adverse actions, but five
other allegations, taken collectively, rose to the level of an adverse action under section
704(a)); Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11 th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
five allegations did not comprise an adverse action, but that the denial of a pay raise and an
extension on tenure clock comprised adverse actions under section 704(a)); Berman v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 160 F.3d 697, 702 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the involuntary
transfer of an employee, which has the effect of substantially reducing income, can
constitute an adverse action).
203. 141 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1998).
204. Id. at 1455.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1455-56.
207. Id. at 1456.
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language interpretation of... [section 704(a)] is consistent with
Title VI's remedial purpose. Permitting employers to
discriminate against an employee who files a charge of
discrimination so long as the retaliatory discrimination does not
constitute an ultimate employment action, could stifle
employees' willingness to file charges of discrimination.
Although we do not doubt that there is some threshold level of
substantiality that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be
cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause, we need not
determine in this case the exact notch into which the bar should
be placed. It is enough to conclude, as we do, that the actions
about which... [the plaintiff] complains considered collectively
are sufficient to constitute prohibited discrimination. We need
not and do not decide whether anything less than the totality of
the alleged reprisals would be sufficient. Accordingly, for
judgment as a matter of law purposes .... [plaintiff's] evidence
satisfied the adverse employment action requirement for a prima
facie case of retaliation. 20s
In Doe v. Dekalb County School District,2 9 the court concluded that
an objective reasonable person standard should govern whether or not a
transfer to another position constitutes an adverse action in a claim of
discrimination (not retaliation) under the ADA.210 While Doe addressed a
claim of discrimination and not retaliation, the court's discussion
concerning what constitutes an adverse action is noteworthy, observing:
[T]he threshold for what constitutes an adverse employment
action [should] not be elevated artificially, because an employer's
action, to the extent that it is deemed not to rise to the level of an
adverse employment action, is removed completely from any
scrutiny for discrimination. In other words, where the cause or
motivation for the employer's action was clearly its employee's
disability, a finding that the action does not rise to the level of an
adverse employment action means that the action is not
scrutinized for discrimination. An artificially high threshold for
what constitutes an adverse employment action would undermine
the purposes of the statute by permitting discriminatory actions to
208. Id. The applicability of the court's holding in Wideman has not been applied in a
claim of harassment in the Eleventh Circuit. In a decision issued prior to Wideman, Wu v.
Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 273 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit noted that it
could not identify any case at that time where retaliatory harassment, as opposed to
harassment based on race or sex under section 703(a), was actionable and would violate
section 704(a)'s anti-retaliation provision. The court's holding in Wideman suggests that a
claim of retaliatory harassment may be cognizable. See infra Part IV (discussing the cause
of action for retaliatory harassment).
209. 145 F.3d 1441 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
210. Id. at 1449.
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1

The D.C. Circuit

An analysis of relevant decisions from the D.C. Circuit reveals that,
historically, the court broadly construed the adverse action requirement in
retaliation claims. 2 2 More recent decisions, however, suggest that the D.C.
Circuit now applies a material harm threshold to the adverse action element
in both discrimination and retaliation claims. 1 3
In Brown v. Brody,214 the plaintiff alleged both discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII when, after engaging in EEO activity, she: (1)
received a "fully satisfactory" rating and letter of admonishment, and (2)
was denied a transfer to a new position in the Project Finance
Department.215 After surveying relevant case law concerning whether or
not a lateral transfer constitutes an adverse action under section 704(a), the
court noted that "the authority requiring a clear showing of adversity in
employee transfer decisions is both wide and deep. 21 6 The court found it
significant that in Ellerth, the Supreme Court cited decisions from the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits that applied a "materiality" threshold to
determine if an employment action constituted a "tangible employment
action. 21 7 The D.C. Circuit then stated:
These developments allow us to announce the following rule: a
plaintiff who is made to undertake or who is denied a lateral
211. Id. at 1453 n.21.
212. See, e.g., Paquin v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Assoc., 119 F.3d 23, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(deciding that the withdrawal of a voluntary benefit, here a severance package, could
constitute an adverse action); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (holding that an employer's decision to cancel a major public symposium in the
plaintiff's honor constitutes an adverse action in a claim of retaliation under the ADEA);
Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1424 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (concluding that repeated threats against an individual who exercises protected rights
may amount to harassment "sufficient to establish a claim of retaliation").
213. See Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 515-16 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding that the
decision not to advertise a director's position after the plaintiff filed an EEO complaint is
tantamount to a denial of a promotion and constitutes an adverse action); Mungin v. Katten
Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-57 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that in a section 703(a)
claim of discrimination, changes in work assignments do not ordinarily constitute adverse
actions unless accompanied by a decrease in pay or changes in work hours); see also Taylor
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 132 F.3d 753, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding that a refusal to
make the plaintiffs acting Section Chiefs were minor and thus insufficient to comprise
adverse actions in a retaliation claim under the First Amendment and Resolution Trust
Corporation Whistleblower Act).
214. 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
215. Id. at451.
216. Id. at 456.
217. Id. at 456-57.
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transfer-that is, one in which she suffers no diminution in pay
or benefits-does not suffer an actionable injury unless there are
some other materially adverse consequences affecting the terms,
conditions, or privileges of her employment or her future
employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible
harm. Mere idiosyncrasies
of personal preference are not
218
sufficient to state an injury.

Concerning the plaintiff's allegation that she received an overall "fully
satisfactory" rating on her performance evaluation, the court stated that "a
similarly thick body of precedent... refutes the notion that formal
criticism or poor performance evaluations are necessarily adverse
actions. 219 Moreover, while the plaintiff's evaluation "may
have been
' 220
lower than normal, it was not adverse in an absolute sense.
As noted previously, the court's holding in Brown is arguably
inconsistent with a prior decision in Smith v. Secretary of the Navy,221
wherein the D.C. Circuit concluded that section 704(a) of Title VII created
a cause of action for a plaintiff who received a negative performance
evaluation in reprisal for engaging in EEO activity, even absent a denial of
a promotion or other economic harm.2 22 The D.C. Circuit noted that section
704(a) speaks unconditionally and without limiting harm to any particular
acts such as the denial of a job or a promotion, and stated:
It is obvious, however, that a plaintiff may suffer harms from
discrimination that fall short of demonstrable loss of a job or a
promotion. An unfavorable employee assessment, placed in a
personnel file to be reviewed in connection with future decisions
concerning pay and promotion, could both prejudice the
employee's superiors and materially diminish his chances for
advancement.
The court also stated:
An illegal act of discrimination-whether based on race or some
other factor such as a motive of reprisal-is a wrong in itself
under Title VII, regardless of whether that wrong would warrant
an award of back pay or preferential hiring. The goal of the
statute is to bar all employer actions based on impermissible
factors.224

218. Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
219. Id. at 458.
220. Id.

221. 659 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
222. Id. at 1120.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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While noting that no financial harm had befallen the plaintiff, the D.C.
Circuit noted that if retaliation was established, the remedy would be to
have the improper evaluation removed from his personnel records.
M. Overview of the Adverse Action Requirement in the Circuits
The adverse action element in a claim of retaliation varies widely in
and among the various circuits.226 Even within a circuit, whether a claim is
cognizable under section 704(a) may depend on the proof presented or the
case law cited by the judge assigned to the matter. 227 Because there lacks
any uniformity regarding what constitutes an adverse action in a claim of
retaliation, the result is that one's ability to prevail in a claim of retaliation
may hinge on the jurisdiction in which he or she brings the claim. For
example, an individual claiming that he or she received a lower
performance evaluation and found that his or her job duties had been
diminished in retaliation for filing an EEO complaint would likely not
prevail in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. 228 Further, unless he or she can
demonstrate material harm to a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, he or she will not prevail in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
D.C. Circuits. 229 Absent evidence that these acts were sufficiently adverse,
this claim is also likely to fail in the Third and Fourth Circuits. 210 The
claim would
likely survive in the First, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
231
Circuits.
Not only are the circuits split on the question of what employment
actions constitute adverse action in a retaliation claim, but in the wake of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragherand Ellerth, a more complex
question concerning harassment has arisen.23 2 Specifically, whether
retaliatory harassment, either by co-workers or by a supervisor, is
actionable under section 704(a) has not been determined. 3 Further, there
225. Id. at 1122; accord Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting the government's "no harm, no foul" approach to establishing a violation of
section 704(a)).
226. See Appendix A (citing examples of how the circuits have construed various
adverse actions).
227. Id. Compare Byrd v. Stone, 202 F.3d 267, No. 97-1841, 2000 WL 32042, at *3
(6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000) (receiving a lower performance evaluation with a demonstrated tie to
a possible promotion stated a claim of retaliation), with Primes v. Reno, 190 F. 3d 765, 767
(6th Cir. 1999) (receiving a lower performance evaluation is not deemed material adverse
action).
228. See supra Parts II.E, H.
229. See supra Parts II.B, F, G, L.
230. See supra Parts II.C, D.
231. See supra Parts II.A, C, I, J, K.
232. See discussion supra Part IV.
233. Id.
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is a split in the circuits concerning what, if anything, constitutes retaliatory
harassment and whether the affirmative defenses are available in a claim of
retaliatory harassment. 234
In 1998, the EEOC issued its Compliance Manual on Retaliation,
wherein it disagreed with circuits requiring material harm or an ultimate
employment action in order to state a prima facie case of retaliation. 2 5 The
Commission established a deterrence standard to determine whether a
negative employment action rises to the level of an adverse action in a
claim of retaliation. 236 Thus far, only the Ninth Circuit has endorsed the
Commission's deterrence standard articulated in the EEOC Compliance
Manual on Retaliation. 237 However, some circuits have construed section
704(a) broadly and, in so doing, have advanced arguments similar to those
raised by the EEOC.?8
I.

IN A CLAIM OF RETALIATION, THE ADVERSE ACTION ELEMENT
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED BY DETERMINING WHETHER IT IS
REASONABLY LIKELY To DETER THE CHARGING PARTY OR OTHERS
FROM ENGAGING IN EEO ACTIVITY

The adverse action element in a claim of retaliation under section
704(a) should not be limited to ultimate employment actions or actions that
result in material harm to a term, condition, or privilege of employment.
Rather, courts should endorse the EEOC's deterrence standard, which
requires a fact finder to consider whether a negative employment action
would be reasonably likely to deter a charging party or others from
engaging in protected activity. 2 9 The deterrence standard is consistent with
the plain meaning of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision and fosters the
broad remedial goals of the applicable anti-discrimination statutes.

234. Id.
235. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13 - 8-14; see also infra Part
II.A.
236. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13; see also infra Part HI.A.
237. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).
238. See Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[A] false
report to the police that... [the plaintiff] was armed and laying in wait outside the plant
could certainly be construed as a retaliatory action meant to discourage [the plaintiff] from
pursuing his claim."); Dilenno v. Goodwill Indus. of Mid-Eastern Pa., 162 F.3d 235, 236
(3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]hat constitutes retaliation depends on what a person in the plaintiffs
position would reasonably understand."); see also EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note
3, at 8-13 n.38 (citing additional cases which have construed retaliation claims under section
704(a) broadly).
239. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13; see also Linda M. Glover,
Comment, Title VII Section 704(A) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward
Justice, 38 HOus. L. REv. 577, 612-13 (2001) (concluding that the EEOC's more liberal
interpretation of the adverse action element should be adopted by courts).
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Additionally, the deterrence standard is consistent with the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of analogous anti-retaliation provisions in
other statutes. Moreover, a narrow interpretation of section 704(a) would
allow many acts of retaliation to go undeterred. This not only undermines
the anti-retaliation provisions, but also hinders the Commission's ability to
effectively enforce anti-discrimination laws. Finally, employer concerns
that such a standard will turn courts into de facto personnel managers is
exaggerated and inapplicable in a retaliation context.
A.

The Commission's DeterrenceApproach

While "It]he most obvious types of retaliation are denial of promotion,
refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, suspension and discharge,"
retaliation can take many other forms, including "threats, reprimands,
negative evaluations, harassment, or other adverse treatment. ' 24° Arguing
that it is improper to require either material harm or an ultimate
employment action with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of
employment in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the
Commission instead notes:
The statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment
that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity. Of course, petty slights and trivial annoyances are not
actionable, as they are not likely to deter protected activity. More
significant retaliatory treatment, however, can be challenged
regardless of the level of harm. As the Ninth Circuit has stated,
the degree of harm suffered by the individual "goes to the issue
of damages, not liability. ' ' "4
In justifying this position, the Commission also states that:
The anti-retaliation provisions are exceptionally broad. They
make it unlawful "to discriminate" against an individual because
of his or her protected activity. This is in contrast to the general
anti-discrimination provisions which make it unlawful to
discriminate with respect to an individual's "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment." The retaliation provisions set no
qualifiers on the term "to discriminate" and therefore prohibit any
discrimination that is reasonably likely to deter protected

240. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-11.
241. Id. at 8-13 (quoting Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997)). The
Commission's deterrence standard is not a "reasonable person" standard like courts utilize
to analyze section 703(a) claims of harassment. Rather, a fact finder should evaluate the
retaliatory conduct itself and determine whether it is reasonably likely to deter either the
charging party or others.
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activity.242
The Commission further notes that while many adverse actions
logically relate to a term, condition, or privilege of employment because
that is the easiest method for an employer to retaliate against its employee,
section 704(a) specifically
[does] not restrict the actions that can be challenged to those that
affect the terms and conditions of employment. Thus, a violation
will be found if an employer retaliates against a worker for
engaging in protected activity through threats, harassment in or
out of the workplace, or any other adverse treatment reasonably
likely to deter
protected activity by this individual or other
24 3
employees.

The EEOC argues that legal authority for its approach is derived from
both the plain language of section 704(a) and the broad remedial purpose of
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
B.

The PlainLanguage of Title VII Supports a BroadReading of Section
704(a)
The term "discriminate," which appears in numerous sections of Title
and the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"

VII, 244

242. Id. at 8-14 nn. 40-42 (citing cases where retaliation was found when adverse actions
did not relate to a term, condition, or privilege of employment).
243. Id. at 8-14 - 8-15. The Commission has also advanced similar arguments in amicus
curiaebriefs. See Brief of the Equal Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods. Inc., 212
F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 97-36191, 98-35036). In its Passantino brief, the
Commission argued:
[The employer's] contrary view of the statute, if accepted, would leave an
employer free to retaliate with impunity. Retaliation can take many forms.
Some employers use the blunt edge approach, either firing or demoting an
employee who engages in protected activity. Other employers are more
sophisticated. These employers stop short of taking action that would result in
some tangible diminution in an individual's job status. Instead, they engage in a
more subtle campaign of threats, reprimands, negative evaluations, and adverse
treatment in job assignments and day-to-day interactions. These actions can
undoubtedly deter individuals from engaging in protected activity. Yet
under... [the employer's] view such actions would fall outside the reach of the
statute, even if engaged in for a retaliatory reason. Plainly, anti-retaliation
protection must extend beyond the narrow range of conduct (e.g., "ultimate
employment decisions") invoked by... [the employer].
Id. at 11.
244. Section 703(c)(3) as codified states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for a labor organization... to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminateagainst
an individual in violation of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1994) (emphasis
added). Section 703(d) as codified reads: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
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which appears only in section 703(a)(1), are not explicitly defined in Title
VII.
Arguably, though, the phrase "to discriminate" refers to
discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" even though the "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" language only appears in section 703(a)(1). 245
The meaning of the term "to discriminate" in section 703, however,
does not end the inquiry as to what Congress intended when it used the
same term in section 704(a) without including the phrase "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. 2 46 The term "discrimination" is
defined as "a failure to treat all equally; favoritism." 247 This definition does
not clarify its intended meaning in section 704(a), other than to say that
Congress' use of the term suggests that it intended to ensure that those who
engage in protected EEO activity are not treated differently, i.e.,
unfavorably or discriminatorily, because of their EEO activity.24 This
conclusion is supported by relevant legislative history which states that "to
discriminate
is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or
249
favor."

any employer.., to discriminateagainst any individual ... in admission to, or employment
in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(d) (emphasis added). Finally, section 703(h) as codified states: "[N]or shall it be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed test, provided that such test, its administration or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race .. " 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (emphasis added).
245. The Supreme Court has stated that its first step in interpreting a statute is "to
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard
to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)
(quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). The inquiry
"must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent."' Id. The Supreme Court then stated that "[t]he plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 341;
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
246. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
247. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (4th ed. 1968).
248. While section 704(a) is commonly referred to as the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII, Black's Law Dictionary defines retaliation in terms of the Latin phrase "lex
talionis," which in turn is defined as "[tihe law of retaliation; which requires the infliction
upon a wrongdoer of the same injury which he has caused to another." Id. at 1058. This
interpretation of retaliation is not applicable to an employer-employee relationship given
any lawful action by an employee is designed not to injure the employer, but to vindicate a
statutorily created right. See 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF

THE CivIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 3039 (1968); see also Lidge, supra note 20, at 373
(discussing the legislative history of Title VII concerning the phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" and the term "discrimination"); Zion, supra note 4, at 195-97
(discussing the legislative history of section 704(a)).
249. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964), reprintedin U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
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Unlike the general anti-discrimination provision in section 703(a), the
anti-retaliation provision in section 704(a) does not specifically limit
discrimination to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.''5°
The legislative history of Title VII does not address the scope of section
704(a).'51 However, because Title VII defines what actions can constitute
discrimination in section 703(a) as actions which impact the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, the majority of circuits have
concluded that the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment language
in section 703(a) should be read co-extensively with section 704(a). 2 The

Commission, however, argues that section 704(a) should not be limited by
the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment qualifier set forth in
section 703(a) because Congress would have included this phrase in section
704(a) had it so intended.53

COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

3040 (1968).
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
251. The First Circuit noted that "[n]either in its wording nor legislative history does
section 704(a) make plain how far Congress meant to immunize... employee activity."
Hochstadt v. Worchester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir.
1976); see also Cude & Steger, supra note 2, at 396 n.146 (citing authority which has
recognized the ambiguity of section 704(a)).
252. See Richardson v. N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999);
Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446,458 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 862
(1st Cir. 1997); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3d Cir. 1997);
Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Mattem v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d
686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997).
253. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13 - 8-15. The Commission
has also advanced this argument in amicus curiae briefs. "It is presumed that 'where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act,... Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."' Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, at 9 n.5, Passantino v. Johnson &
Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 97-36191, 98-35036)
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). Two authors suggest that Congressional
intent concerning the scope of section 704(a) can be gleaned by reviewing the ADA's antiretaliation provision. See Essary & Friedman, supra note 20, at 152. The authors argue that:

Mhe fact that the ADA explicitly allows for retaliation in the form of mere

coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference should serve to clarify the
meaning of retaliation under the ADA's predecessors. The fact that such
definitive language was excluded from Title VII and the ADEA should not be
considered representative of Congress' intent regarding the prior statutes
because the distasteful but inescapable conclusion would be that Congress
somehow intended to provide disabled victims of discrimination greater
protection from workplace retaliation than victims of racial or sexual
discrimination.
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One article argues that the rule of ejusdem generis applies, and that the
general term "to discriminate" in section 704(a) should be read in the
context of the specific phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" contained in section 703(a).z 4 The article argues that
because Title VII was enacted to address discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin with respect to the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, the terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment qualifier should also apply to claims of
retaliation brought under section 704(a). 5 The broad remedial goals of the
anti-discrimination statutes, however, argue against such a conclusion. 25 6 In
fact, ejusdem generis applies unless "its application would defeat the
intention of Congress or render the general statutory language
meaningless. ' z 7

C.

The BroadRemedial Goals of Title VII Support a Broad Interpretation
of Section 704(a)

The Commission's deterrence standard furthers the goals of the antidiscrimination statutes generally, and the anti-retaliation provisions
specifically, by ensuring that any adverse action which would reasonably
deter a charging party or others from engaging in EEO activity would be
actionable under section 704(a).258 Considering whether a negative action
deters not only the charging party but others is crucial, as allowing an
employer to retaliate against an individual bringing an EEO charge also
"carries with it the distinct risk that other employees may be deterred
from... providing testimony for the plaintiff in her effort to [vindicate26her
rights]."' 59 As the Seventh Circuit observed in McDonnell v. Cisneros: 0
Generally one retaliates against someone because of something
he did rather than because of something someone else did. Not
always. There is such a thing as collective punishment. But that
possibility is unlikely to have been at the forefront of

254. See Cude & Steger, supra note 2, at 397-98. Under the rule of ejusdem generis,
"[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words
are construed to embrace only those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 188 (5th ed.
1992).
255. Cude & Steger, supra note 2, at 397-98.
256. Glover, supra note 239, at 610 (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94
(1975) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
257. Id.
258. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-14 - 8-15.
259. Holt v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1983).
260. 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
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congressional thinking when the retaliation provision was
drafted.
There are two situations, apparently not foreseen by Congress, in
which a literal interpretation of the provision would leave a gaping
hole in the protection of complainants and witnesses. The first
situation, related to our point about collective punishment, is where
the employer either does not know who the complainant is and decides
therefore to retaliate against a group of workers that he knows
includes the complainant, or makes a mistake and retaliates against the
wrong person. The second situation... is where the employer
retaliates against an employee for having failed to prevent the filing of
a complaint. Both are cases of genuine retaliation, and we cannot
think of any reason.., other than pure oversight, why Congress
would have excluded them from the protection of... [section 704(a)].
It does no great violence to the statutory language to construe "he has
made a charge" to include "he was suspected
' 2 61 of having made a
charge" and "he allowed a charge to be made.
Limiting section 704(a) claims of retaliation to acts which either result
in an ultimate employment action or in material harm to a term, condition,
or privilege of employment would severely constrict section 704(a)'s reach,
resulting in countless acts of retaliation not otherwise considered material
or ultimate employment actions going undeterred. For example, if an
individual receives an undeserved negative evaluation because he or she
engaged in EEO activity, such an undeserved negative evaluation is
adverse to the recipient because it may impact his or her future promotional
opportunities. Fear of having one's career opportunities jeopardized
because he or she engages in EEO activity not only is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party him or herself, but it also sends a powerful
message to his or her co-workers that there are potentially careerthreatening ramifications when one files an EEO charge or otherwise
participates in the EEO process. Requiring a threshold of material harm or
an ultimate employment action simply fails to include such acts of
retaliation, and, thus, such retaliation would go undeterred.262
Moreover, requiring that adverse actions under section 704(a)
establish some threshold of material harm or rise to the level of an ultimate
employment action in a term, condition, or privilege of employment will
require courts to demonstrate tangential connections between adverse
actions and the terms, conditions, or privileges of an employee's

261. Id. at 262.
262. See, e.g., Spears v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 853-54 (8th
Cir. 2000); Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1999); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194
F.3d 788, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1999).
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employment. 263 In those circuits which require that adverse actions relate
to a term, condition, or privilege of employment in conjunction with
requiring material harm or an ultimate employment action, an employer
who files false criminal charges against an employee because he or she
engaged in EEO activity may not recognize such an action as within the
realm of retaliatory actions that Title VII can remedy. "The law
deliberately does not take a 'laundry list' approach to retaliation, because
unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human imagination will
permit.' 264 The more sensible approach is to apply the deterrence standard
advocated by the Commission.
Courts which broadly construe the anti-retaliation provisions have
found retaliation where adverse actions did not relate to a term, condition,
or privilege of employment, but nonetheless would deter a charging party
or others from engaging in protected EEO activity. 265 As one district court
judge recently observed:
[F]ear of any type of retaliation can deter an aggrieved person
from filing an EEOC charge, and since the charge must, a
fortiori, relate to equality of employment opportunities, to say
that retaliation not resulting in an adverse employment action is
therefore unrelated66 to employment conditions does not
necessarily follow.

263. See Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that malicious prosecution of a former employee can constitute an adverse employment
action).
264. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
265. See, e.g., Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
that falsely informing police that the plaintiff was armed and laying in wait outside the
facility could constitute adverse action in claim of retaliation); Berry, 74 F.3d at 986
(malicious prosecution of criminal forgery and theft charges against a former employee who
filed an EEO charge constituted adverse action); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d
194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994) (inquiring into the progress of license revocation proceedings
against a former employee constituted retaliation); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d
322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (canceling a symposium in honor of a former employee because
he filed a charge of age discrimination states a claim of retaliation); see also Beckham v.
Grand Affair, 671 F. Supp. 415, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (finding retaliation where an
employer had a former employee arrested and prosecuted); Atkinson v. Oliver T. Carr Co.,
40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1041, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding that an employer's
threat to press criminal charges unless the EEO charge was dropped states a claim of
retaliation under Title VII); Czarnowski v. Desoto, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (N.D. 111.
1981) (disclosing the record of an employee's protected EEO activity to a prospective
employer constitutes adverse action); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 393, 396 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that a supervisor's threat to beat an employee
because of an EEOC complaint was harassment); Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 347 F. Supp. 268, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (engaging in acts of
physical violence in retaliation for filing an EEO charge violates section 704(a)).
266. EEOC v. Die Fliedermaus, L.L.C., 77 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
While some courts have opined that conduct outside the scope of terms, conditions, or
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Moreover, a deterrence standard is more consistent with the Supreme
Court's recognition that Congress considered its policies against
discrimination to be of the "highest priority." 267 The Supreme Court stated
that a "primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions" is to maintain
"unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms. ' 26' In Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo., the Supreme Court noted that:
Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the
enforcement process of Title VII... [and] the private right of

action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial
enforcement of Title VII. In such cases, the private litigant
redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important
congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices.269
Some circuits have similarly recognized the importance, not only of
the Commission, but of individual plaintiffs, in eradicating unlawful

discrimination. 270
Construing Title VII's anti-retaliation provision broadly is consistent
privileges of employment which are adverse to an employee or former employee are better
left resolved via other statutory remedies, the court in Die Fliedermaus addressed this
suggestion, noting that:
[Tihere may be circumstances where retaliation not related to an adverse
employment action is not actionable under a separate legal theory. While it
could be possible to fashion a rule permitting a retaliation claim to lie if the
violative conduct is not otherwise actionable, this would impose the
unnecessary burden on courts and litigants of determining whether a given
instance of non-employment related retaliation was otherwise actionable. The
more logical rule is to allow the retaliation claim to be actionable if the
retaliation is sufficiently alleged to flow from the filing of the EEOC charge.
Id.; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (imposing liability
for acts of supervisor harassment under Title VII even when such actions are not
employment related); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974) (citing
the legislative history of Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
which noted that nothing in Title VII affects existing rights under other employment
statutes).
267. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968).
268. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997); see also NLRB v. Scrivener,
405 U.S. 117, 121-122 (1972) (regarding a violation of the NLRA); Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292-293 (1960) (regarding a violation of the FLSA).
269. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted).
270. See EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs., 957 F.2d 424,431 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting that anti-retaliation provisions in the ADEA and Title VII protect charging
parties and "aid the work of the EEOC which depends on employee cooperation"); see also
Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, 839 F.2d 872, 879 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that one of the
FLSA's purposes is to make whole individual employees); Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400,
1405 (9th Cir. 1986); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005-06 (5th Cir.
1969) ("[P]rotection must be afforded to those who seek the benefit of statutes designed by
Congress to equalize employer and employee in matters of employment.").
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with Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., wherein the Supreme Court extended
coverage to former employees even though Title VII did not specify that
the term "employee" in Title VII included former employees. 271 Finding
the plain language ambiguous, the Court in Robinson examined other
relevant sections of Title VII, considered the broad remedial goals of Title
VII, and noted that a reading of Title VII which excluded former
employees from coverage under section 704(a) produced anomalous
results.272 Additionally,272in Bill Johnson's Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB, 273 the
Court concluded that the filing of a lawsuit by an employer in retaliation
for an employee's protected activity under section 8 of the National Labor
Relations Act 274 constitutes an unlawful act of retaliation. 27' The Supreme
Court stated that "[a] lawsuit... may be used by an employer as a
powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation, 27 6 and that such suit can be
enjoined as an act of unlawful retaliation if the suit is "baseless" and
brought "with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise
of [protected rights] .,277
Furthermore, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 278 the Supreme

Court discussed what constitutes an adverse action in a claim of retaliation
based on First Amendment prohibitions against government officials from
taking adverse actions against public employees who do not support the
political party in power.279

In Rutan, the Court noted that along with

discharge, several patronage practices such as promotion, transfer, recall,
and hiring decisions constitute adverse actions and such negative actions
would violate the First Amendment unless party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the position involved. 2 0 The Court rejected the
employer's argument that such decisions do not violate the First
Amendment because they do not have any adverse effect on a term of
271. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (1997). Most recently, in Clark County Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed two claims brought under
section 704(a), though its decision focused on both the first and third elements of a prima
facie case of retaliation. Id. at 1512. The Court did not address the adverse action element
in a section 704(a) claim.
272. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 348-49. The Supreme Court's approach to analyzing section
704(a) in Robinson may be instructive as to how the Court may analyze and ultimately
construe the term "discrimination" in section 704(a).
273. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
274. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994).
275. Bill Johnson's Restaurant,461 U.S. at 744.
276. Id. at 740.
277. Id. at 744. The NLRA's anti-retaliation provision served as the model for Title
VII's anti-retaliatory provision. See Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearingon H.R. 405
Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong. 83-84
(1963) (statement of Thomas E. Harris, Associate General Counsel of the AFL-CIO).
278. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
279. Id. at 74.
280. Id. at 75.
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employment and do not chill protected rights, and observed that:
Employees who find themselves in dead-end positions due to
their political backgrounds are adversely affected. They will feel
a significant obligation to support political positions held by their
superiors, and to refrain from acting on the political views they
actually hold, in order to progress up the career ladder.
Employees denied transfers to workplaces reasonably close to
their homes until they join and work for the Republican Party
will feel a daily pressure from their long commutes to do so.
And employees who have been laid off may well feel compelled
to engage in whatever political activity is necessary to regain
regular paychecks and positions corresponding to their skill and
experience.28
The Supreme Court also noted that "the First Amendment... already
protects state employees not only from patronage dismissals, but also from
'even an act of retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a
when intended to punish her for exercising her free
public employee..,
28 2
speech rights.'
Of course, "petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable, as
they are not likely to deter protected activity. '283 Accordingly, the failure
to hold a birthday party for an employee who filed an EEO charge may
very well constitute the kind of adverse action which would not reasonably
deter a charging party or others from engaging in EEO activity. Rutan is
significant, however, because it suggests that some quantum of evidence of
retaliation, arguably less than that which would constitute material harm or
an ultimate employment action, can deter individuals and is thus sufficient
to sustain a claim of retaliation.
The Seventh Circuit in McDonnell v. Cisneros recognized the parallels
between a retaliation claim and a claim in a First Amendment cause of
action, and stated:
We do not doubt that anger, irritation, dirty looks, even the silent
treatment, can cause distress and by doing so discourage
complaints; and in other contexts every rather petty attempts at
humiliation, if sufficient to deter the exercise of a right, have
281. Id. at73.
282. Id. at 76 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
868 F.2d 943, 954 n.4. (7th Cir. 1989)). Lower courts continue to address the scope of
claims of retaliation rooted in First Amendment freedoms based on the Supreme Court's
language in Rutan, and its "famous footnote 8." See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 510
(5th Cir. 1999); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.2d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that
in the Third Circuit, placing a candidate lower on a promotion ranking list in retaliation for
exercising First Amendment rights could deter a reasonable person from exercising such
rights).
283. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13.
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been held to be actionable as infringements of rights, for example
the right of free speech.2 4
The court further noted:
There is, however, a tension in the cases (including the cases of
this court) with respect to whether more is required in a
retaliation case under Title VII (or under any of the other federal
employment discrimination statutes that are modeled on Title
VII, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), the
more being something that can be described as a "materially
adverse employment action."
No limiting language appears in Title VII's retaliation
provision.... The language of "materially adverse employment
action" that some courts employ in retaliation cases is a
paraphrase of Title VII's basic prohibition against employment
discrimination, found in... [section 703(a)].... The provision
regarding retaliation may intentionally be broader, since it is
obvious that effective retaliation against employment
discrimination need not take the form of a job action. Shooting a
person for filing a complaint of discrimination would be an
effective method of retaliation.285
Finally, anti-retaliation provisions in analogous statutes enacted to
protect worker rights have also been construed broadly. 286 Adopting the
Commission's deterrence standard when analyzing claims of retaliation
under section 704(a) will ensure that employees are not chilled from
exercising their rights under the applicable anti-discrimination laws, and
will prevent many forms of retaliation from escaping scrutiny where such
acts deter EEO activity but otherwise do not comprise an ultimate
employment action or allege material harm to a term, condition or privilege
of employment.

284. 84 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1996).
285. Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted).
286. See EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding
that a broad construction of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision protects employees who
raise a grievance directly to his or her employer); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124
(3d Cir. 1987) (concluding that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision was designed to
protect employees from fear of economic retaliation); see also Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32
F.3d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The OSH Act's requirement that employers not retaliate
against complaining employees, like the Act generally, should be read broadly, 'otherwise
the Act would be gutted by employer intimidation."') (quoting Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.,
593 F.2d 715, 722 (6th Cir. 1979)).
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D. Employers' Fearsthat a BroadInterpretationof Section 704(a) Will
Turn Courts into De FactoPersonnelManagersare Exaggeratedand
Inapplicablein a Retaliation Context
Courts and commentators have argued that requiring a higher
threshold of harm to state a claim of retaliation promotes consistency and
helps courts avoid cluttering their dockets and becoming de facto personnel
managers.287 However, as one commentator noted, "[t]o suggest that a
narrower definition under section 704(a) leads to less litigation is not
empirically supported, especially considering the recent trend of increased
litigation on retaliation claims." 8 The Commission's deterrence standard
will not open the floodgates to a litany of baseless claims of retaliation, nor
will the application of a deterrence standard result in a dramatic increase in
findings of retaliation. Even if an adverse action is reasonably likely to
deter a charging party or others from engaging in EEO activity, the
retaliation claim is not resolved.2"9 A plaintiff must still establish a causal
connection between the adverse action and his or her protected activity in
order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.2 90 Indeed, the plaintiff
still has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for
retaliation. 291
Moreover, a narrow interpretation of the adverse action requirement
also fails to recognize that adverse actions motivated by unlawful
retaliation not only harm the charging party, but co-workers and other
employees as well.292 For example, such a threshold would fail to
recognize or provide any kind of remedy for what the plaintiff's co-workers
in Munday must have felt about the EEO process when they were ordered
by their supervisor to ignore and spy on the plaintiff, and report even the
because the plaintiff had
slightest workplace violations to the supervisor
293
accused the supervisor of sexual harassment.
287. See Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that a broad
interpretation of section 704(a) could potentially transform the admonition of a problem
employee into a federal lawsuit); Cude & Steger, supra note 2, at 398 ("A liberal
interpretation... opens the door to a myriad of claims for trivial acts, and gives the courts
free reign to second-guess an employer's business decisions.... [Whereas a narrow
interpretation] leaves management prerogatives largely undisturbed and prevents the courts
from becoming bogged down in trivial disputes within the workplace.").
288. Zion, supra note 4, at 215; see also Glover, supra note 239, at 607-08 (concluding
that concerns about liberal interpretation are "overstated").
289. See supra Part I.C (discussing elements of the prima facie case of retaliation and the
application of the burden-shifting analysis to claims of retaliation).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See infra Part ffl.A. (discussing the EEOC Compliance Manual).
293. Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1997); see supra
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The threshold for determining what constitutes an adverse action in a
claim of retaliation should not be determined by the "ultimate" nature of
the employment action or the "material" nature of the harm to a term,
condition, or privilege of employment suffered by the charging party.
Rather, the threshold should be based on whether or not the adverse action
is reasonably likely to deter a charging party or others from engaging in
any EEO activity. 294 A fact finder should not be precluded from reviewing
whether such actions were more likely than not motivated by retaliatory
animus, as such actions in the workplace, if left undeterred, send the
powerful message that employees who exercise their unfettered right to file
a charge of discrimination will be allowed to suffer retaliation.295
Ultimately, the question of what harm befalls a charging party who is a
addressed at the remedial stage,
victim of retaliation is more appropriately
296
and not at the prima facie stage.
IV. RETALIATORY HARASSMENT SHOULD BE ACTIONABLE EVEN IF NOT
"SEVERE OR PERVASIVE"

The Supreme Court has stated that a workplace permeated with
animus which is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment is
actionable without regard to a specific requirement of economic harm or
29
psychological injury. 9 The Court has also concluded that a claim of
harassment which results in a "tangible employment action" 29 will result in
vicarious liability for an employer, however, absent any tangible
employment action, an employer has the opportunity to raise an affirmative
defense to liability.299 The intersection of harassment law and the standard
for stating a claim of retaliation will present interesting challenges for
courts to resolve.3tu Should the Supreme Court adopt the Commission's
deterrence standard for analyzing section 704(a) retaliation claims, then
discussion Part II.D.
294. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13.
295. Id. at 8-15.
296. See Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that harm
suffered is a determination at the remedies, not the threshold stage).
297. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
298. In Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court defined a
tangible employment action as "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, falling to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
299. Id. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
300. See Margery Corbin Eddy, Note, Finding the Appropriate Standardfor Employer
Liability in Title VII Retaliation Cases: An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual
HarassmentParadigms,63 ALB. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1999).
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courts will have to address whether, and to what extent, the section 703(a)
harassment paradigm applies to section 704(a) claims of retaliation.
To state a claim of harassment under section 703(a), the alleged
harassment must either result in a tangible employment action to the
charging party or the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
so as to alter the charging party's conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment. 30 1 As argued previously, the "terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment" language from section 703(a)
does not apply to section 704(a) claims. 3°
The deterrence standard
provides that claims of retaliation brought under section 704(a) must allege,
for threshold purposes, that the adverse actions would be reasonably likely
to deter a charging party or others from engaging in EEO activity. 3°3 Thus,
the deterrence standard, and not a severe or pervasive standard, should be
utilized in order to determine whether any act of retaliation would
reasonably be likely to deter a charging party or others from engaging in
EEO activity.3°4 As a result, the distinction between claims of disparate
treatment and harassment under section 704(a) disappears at the threshold
stage.
While courts have been applying a "severe or pervasive" threshold to
all claims of harassment, this is an inappropriate threshold to determine if
adverse actions state a claim of retaliation under section 704(a) because
conduct which is not "severe or pervasive" so as to alter the working
conditions of the charging party may still reasonably deter a charging party
or others from engaging in EEO activity. 0 5 If courts fail to recognize this
important distinction, then individuals such as Jean Mattem will continue
to face the Hobson's choice of enduring sexual harassment so as to avoid
retaliatory harassment, or by reporting sexual harassment, endure acts of
retaliation which do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive conduct so
as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment, but which nonetheless chill one's 0desire
to pursue a remedy
6
statutes.
anti-discrimination
applicable
the
under
Thus far, every circuit addressing claims of harassment under section
704(a) has imported the section 703(a) harassment paradigm to claims of
retaliatory harassment under section 704(a) and required a plaintiff to
establish that the conduct at issue was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as
to alter the conditions of employment.3 7 Moreover, the only circuit to
301. Harris,510 U.S. at 21-22.
302. See infra Parts IHL.B-C.
303. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13.
304. See infra Part II.A.
305. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, at 8-13 - 8-15.
306. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-708 (5th Cir. 1997); infra
discussion Part I.E.
307. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.
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specifically consider retaliatory harassment in the wake of Faragherand
Ellerth concluded that the threshold for establishing a prima facie case of
harassment based on retaliation required a showing of severe or pervasive
conduct, and remanded the case to the district court in order to determine if
the affirmative defense was available to the employer.0 8
Establishing a deterrence standard to measure all threshold claims of
retaliation does not necessarily mean that the affirmative defenses set forth
in Faragherand Ellerth, which are applied in section 703(a) claims of
harassment, are not available in a claim of retaliatory harassment brought
under section 704(a). In fact, the policy reasons for establishing the
affirmative defense set forth in Faragherand Ellerth to section 703(a)
claims of harassment also support the application of an affirmative defense
to claims of harassment under section 704(a), which do not result in a
tangible employment action.309 Arguably, employers should have an
opportunity to establish the elements of the affirmative defense before a

1999); Richmond-Hopes v. City of Cleveland, 168 F.3d 490, No. 97-3595, 1998 WL
808222, at *9 (6th Cir. 1998); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262-64
(10th Cir. 1998); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998);
Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13,
15-16 (1st Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit may or may not have adopted such an analysis.
Compare Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1074 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[W[here a supervisory
employee.., is shown to have used... [his] authority to retaliate for the filing of a charge
of sexual harassment, the plaintiff need not also prove that the employer participated in or
knew or should have known of the retaliatory conduct to hold the employer liable."), with
Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that ostracism
in the workplace did not constitute a claim of retaliation because it did not rise to the level
of an ultimate employment action).
308. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784,792-93 (6th Cir. 2000).
309. If harassment results in a tangible employment action, an employer is automatically
liable, whereas if the harassment does not result in a tangible employment action, then the
affirmative defense outlined in Faragherand Ellerth is available to exonerate an employer
from liability. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). For the policy
considerations articulated in Farragherand Ellerth, the Supreme Court was careful to limit
what constituted a "tangible employment action" because such actions would result in
automatic liability and provide no affirmative defense for employers. Id at 761. In Ellerth,
the Supreme Court set forth the affirmative defense as follows:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee.
When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.... The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Id. at 765 (citation omitted).
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charging party or others would have been deterred by acts of retaliation."'
The resolution of this question, however, should in no way vitiate the need
for courts to revise the existing standard for establishing a threshold, or
prima facie case of retaliation under section 704(a).
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted, a majority of the
circuits, in varying degrees, have chipped away the anti-retaliation
provisions of the anti-discrimination statutes by limiting what actions are
considered adverse for threshold purposes. A narrow construction
undermines the anti-discrimination statutes and permits employers to
retaliate with impunity. A deterrence standard ensures that actions taken
with retaliatory intent are cognizable so long as the adverse action rises
above the threshold of trivial conduct or a minor annoyance. The Supreme
Court should grant certiorari, end the disparity amongst the circuits, and
embrace the deterrence standard. Only a consistent application of a
deterrence standard nationwide will ensure that the goals of our nation's
anti-discrimination laws remain protected.

310. A question for courts to consider will be whether the same policy reasons discussed
in Faragherand Ellerth will prompt courts to fashion an analogous affirmative defense in
the retaliation context. Just as in claims of harassment under section 703(a), a court may
opine that, for acts of retaliation which actually result in a tangible employment action, no
affirmative defense is available. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (holding that no affirmative
defense is available when a supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action.) However, for acts of retaliation by a supervisor or co-workers which do not result
in a tangible employment action, but may otherwise deter a reasonable person or others
from engaging in EEO activity, courts may opine that an employer should have the
opportunity to utilize the same affirmative defense available in claims of harassment rooted
in claims brought under section 703(a). See id. at 763-64; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 806-08 (1998).
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APPENDIX A.

Are the following adverse actions sufficiently adverse to state a claim
of retaliation? This chart only represents a few of the many kinds of
adverse actions often raised in complaints of retaliation. However, because
courts interpret the adverse action element differently, claims based on
these adverse actions may or may not be cognizable.
While the
conclusions in this chart are admittedly over-simplified because each court
examined many facts which contributed to the conclusions reached in the
cases cited below, the general disagreement amongst the circuits in this
area is nonetheless troubling for advocates, employees, employers and fact
finders.

2002]

CIRCUIT

FIRST
CIRCUIT

DETERRENCE V. MATERIAL HARM

LOWERED OR NEGATIVE
PERFORMANCE

Yes - Wyatt

SECOND
CIRcurr

THIRD
CIRCUIT
FOURTH
CIRcuIT

Maybe - Shaner

FIFTH
CIRCUIT

TRANSFER

"HARASSMENT"

Yes - Wyatt; Randlett

Yes - Wyatt
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